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Short Answer Part 1 Consider this as a simultaneous-move (static) game: Player A has three available strategies: Top, Middle, and Bottom. Player B has two available strategies: Left and Right. Player B Left Right ETop | S 1 | 1,3 Player A _____________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________ Middle 0,4 = 2,4 Bottom 4,2 o 7 1. a) Write down the Best Response Correspondence for each player. 1. b) Does any player have a dominant strategy in this game? Explain. 1. ) Does any player have a dominated strategy in this game? Explain. 1. d) Find all Nash Equilibria in pure strategies of this game. 1. e) Suppose Player A rules out the "Middle" strategy. The game is the same except without Player A's "Middle" strategy row. Is there any Nash Equilibria in mixed strategies? If so, find it