This problem is taken from Exercisell of Chapter 9 Easley and Kleinberg's textbook: Network, Crowds and Markets. In a second-price, sealed auction for a single item. We'll consider case in which true values for the item may differ across bidders, and it requires extensive research by a bidder to determine her own true value for an item-maybe this is because bidder needs to determine her ability to extract value from item after purchasing it. (In this ability may differ from bidder to bidder). There are three bidders. Bidders 1 and 2 have values v1 and v2, each of which is a random number independently and uniformly distributed on the interval [0,1]. Through having performed the requisite level of research bidder 1 and 2 know their own values for the item, v1 and v2, respectively, but they don't know each other's value for item. Bidder 3 hasn't performed enough research to know his own true value for the item. He does know that he and bidder 2 are extremely similar, and therefore that's true value V3 is exactly equal to the true value v; of bidder 2. The problem is that bidder 3 doesn't know this value v; (nor does he know v1). (a) How should bidder 1 bid in this auction? How should bidder2 bid? (b) How should bidder 3 behave in this auction? Provide an explanation for your answer; a formal proof is not necessary