This question is a modification of the scenario presented in your Week Two Discussion post, CiaramitarovRuggero, Docket No. 350237, with a few slight changes in the fact pattern. Instead of using the swing trainer at one of the children's homes, the parents took the group of girls to the baseball diamond at their middle school after school let out on Friday afternoon to practice there. And, instead of hitting Martina in the face with the bat, Ariana swung so hard that the bat slipped out of her hand on the backswing and flew approximately 20-30 yards away.

Now, the baseball diamond the girls were using was adjacent to a medium sized concrete patio in front of a side entrance to the school. The entrance consisted of a pair of solid steel double doors set about 10 feet apart with a dark tinted window in between them. This entrance was near the gym toward the back of the building. The patio was where students waited to be let into school in the morning, where the track team did its warmups on the side of the building in warm weather, and where the Phys Ed teacher led the students out of the building for outdoor classes. Although it was a highly used area, it was after 4:00 o'clock and between seasons for sports.

The pitcher's mound faced the double doors, such that a batter standing at home plate would have their back to the doors. And, it just so happened that at the exact moment that Ariana swung and lost control of the bat, a custodian, Jerry, was exiting through the doors to leave the building for the day. Normally, he would have been done with work at 3:30 p.m.; however, as he was driving away he realized that he forgot to lock a supply closet, so he had to turn around and go back into the building to lock it. Leaving a supply closet unlocked is an OSHA violation and grounds for discipline.

The bat hit him in the face, broke his nose, knocked out 5 teeth, knocked him down to the ground, causing a large gash across his eye and forehead. He eventually made a full recovery, but had to undergo several facial surgeries, has a disfiguring scar, false front teeth, and missed three months of work. He also experiences frequent migraine headaches which impair his ability to sleep. He is now being treated for depression.

What claims that we have studied in this cousedoes he have against Ariana, her mother, and the school to recover for his injuries and economic losses? NOTE: You not need to state whether he would prevail, but you should identify all the claims that could reasonably be stated based on the facts that you know and the necessary elements of those claims.

Plaintiff, by her next friend Maria Ciaramitaro (Maria), appeals as of right the order granting summary disposition in favor of defendants, Carmina Ruggero, also known as Carmelina Ruggero (Carmelina), individually and as next friend of Ariana Ruggero (Ariana). We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. I. BACKGROUND On June 24, 2016, plaintiff, Ariana, and several other children were at Carmelina's home using a device called a swing trainer to practice hitting a baseball with a metal baseball bat. As part of this activity, the children took turns using a single baseball bat. While one child used the baseball bat, the rest of the children waited in line behind the batter. When it was Ariana's turn to use the swing trainer, she swung the baseball bat and inadvertently struck plaintiff in the face. As a result, plaintiff suffered serious injuries. Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit seeking to recover damages from Ariana and Carmelina. Plaintiff alleged that Ariana was acting negligently when she struck plaintiff in the mouth with a baseball bat, and that Carmelina was negligent by failing to supervise Ariana and plaintiff while they were at Carmelina's home. Defendants moved for summary disposition under MCR -2- 2.116(C)(10), and the trial court issued an opinion and entered an order granting defendants' motion. This appeal followed. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW This Court reviews de novo a trial court's decision on a motion for summary disposition. El-Khalil v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc, 504 Mich 152, 159; 934 NW2d 665 (2019). A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual sufficiency of a claim. Id. at 160. When considering a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10), the trial court must consider all evidence submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Id. "A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) may only be granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact." Id. (citation omitted). "A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ." Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, the issue of the applicable standard of care is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo. Composto v Albrecht, 328 Mich App 496, 499; 938 NW2d 755 (2019) (citation omitted). III. ANALYSIS A. PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM AGAINST ARIANA Plaintiff first argues on appeal that the trial court erred by granting summary disposition in favor of defendants with respect to plaintiff's claim against Ariana. We disagree. In order to establish a prima facie case of negligence, a plaintiff must establish "(1) duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, (2) breach of that duty by the defendant, (3) damages suffered by the plaintiff, and (4) that the damages were caused by the defendant's breach of duty." Id. (citation omitted). "Duty is the legal obligation to conform one's conduct to a particular standard to avoid subjecting others to an unreasonable risk of harm." Id. (citation omitted). "The duty a defendant typically owes to a plaintiff often is described as an ordinary-negligence standard of care." Id. at 499-500 (citation omitted). "Under ordinary-negligence principles, a defendant owes a plaintiff a duty to exercise ordinary care under the circumstances." Id. at 500 (citation omitted). Nevertheless, the Michigan Supreme Court has held that "coparticipants in recreational activities owe each other a duty not to act recklessly." Ritchie-Gamester v City of Berkley, 461 Mich 73, 75; 597 NW2d 517 (1999). The Michigan Supreme Court has explained this standard as follows: [W]hen people engage in a recreational activity, they have voluntarily subjected themselves to certain risks inherent in that activity. As a result, coparticipants in a recreational activity owe each other a duty not to act recklessly. This recklessness standard of care, however, extends only to injuries that arise from risks inherent to the activity. Therefore, to determine the standard of care applicable when an injury arises involving coparticipants in a recreational activity, a court must consider whether the injuries arose from risks inherent in that recreational activity. [Composto, 328 Mich App at 500 (citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted).] -3- In adopting this standard, the Michigan Supreme Court noted that it set forth the standard as applying broadly to all recreational activities, however, "the precise scope of this rule is best established by allowing it to emerge on a case-by-case basis, so that we might carefully consider the application of the recklessness standard in various factual contexts." Ritchie-Gamester, 461 Mich at 89, n 9. We conclude that the trial court did not err when it determined that the reckless-misconduct standard applied where plaintiff and Ariana were coparticipants in a recreational activity, and plaintiff's injuries arose from inherent risks associated with that recreational activity. As an initial matter, plaintiff asserts that the children's use of a swing trainer to practice baseball cannot be considered a recreational activity because it was neither an organized sporting activity nor an informal activity taking place at a site specifically designated for such an activity. We disagree. When considering whether to apply the reckless-misconduct standard, Michigan courts have generally refrained from narrowly defining what activities may be considered recreational. For instance, in Composto, 328 Mich App at 502, this Court determined that the parties were coparticipants in a recreational activity based upon their shared use of a multipurpose trail designated for hiking and bicycling. Additionally, in Ritchie-Gamester, 461 Mich at 89, the Michigan Supreme Court determined that the parties were coparticipants in a recreational activity based upon their mutual participation in an "open skate" period at an ice rink. Indeed, none of these activities had competition or formal rules. Thus, the children's use of a swing trainer to practice baseball is a recreational activity for purposes of considering whether the recklessmisconduct standard is applicable. Plaintiff further asserts that she was not a coparticipant in a recreational activity with Ariana because plaintiff was simply observing Ariana using the swing trainer rather than using it herself. Again, we disagree. In Composto, 328 Mich App at 502, this Court determined that the parties were coparticipants in a recreational activity based upon their shared use of a multipurpose trail designated for hiking and bicycling. Although the parties were engaged in the inherently distinct activities of walking and biking, the parties were both present for the same reason of utilizing a multipurpose trail. Id. at 502-503. Likewise, in the instant matter, although Ariana and plaintiff were engaged in inherently distinct activities of swinging a baseball bat and standing nearby, they were both present for the purpose of using the swing trainer. During their depositions, plaintiff, Ariana, and another child each testified that they were engaging in the activity of using the swing trainer when plaintiff's injuries occurred. According to the children, only one person could use the swing trainer at any given time. For this reason, the rest of the children stood in line and waited for their turn while the swing trainer was in use. Notably, plaintiff testified that she went to the front yard to play with the swing trainer, and plaintiff was either first or second in line and waiting to use the swing trainer when she was struck with the baseball bat. The record evidence before us is clear that plaintiff was in line for the purpose of using the swing trainer, and therefore plaintiff's claim that she was merely observing Ariana when plaintiff was struck with the baseball bat lacks merit. We therefore conclude that the trial court did not err when it determined that plaintiff and Ariana were coparticipants in a recreational activity. -4- The next inquiry thus becomes whether plaintiff's injuries arose from inherent risks associated with using a swing trainer. The reckless-misconduct standard of care extends only to injuries that arise from risks inherent in a recreational activity. Composto, 328 Mich App at 500. "[T]he assessment of whether a risk is inherent to an activity depends on whether a reasonable person under the circumstances would have foreseen the particular risk that led to injury." Bertin v Mann, 502 Mich 603, 619; 918 NW2d 707 (2018). "If so, then the risk is inherent and the reckless-misconduct standard of care applies." Id. "The risk must be defined by the factual circumstances of the caseit is not enough that the participant could foresee being injured in general; the participant must have been able to foresee that the injury could arise through the 'mechanism' it resulted from." Id. at 620-621 (citation omitted). "Relatedly, those factual circumstances include the general characteristics of the participants, such as their relationship to each other and to the activity and their experience with the sport." Id. at 621 (citations omitted). Although the foreseeability of this type of risk is generally a question of fact, "[i]f no genuine issue of material fact remains, then a court can decide the issue under MCR 2.116(C)(10)." Id. at 619 n 49. The trial court correctly determined that there was no genuine issue of material fact that a reasonable person under the circumstances would have foreseen the risks associated with using a swing trainer. Indeed, we conclude that plaintiff's injuries arose from inherent risks associated with using a swing trainer. At the outset, we acknowledge that on that date plaintiff's injuries occurred, plaintiff was nine years old and had never used a swing trainer before. Despite plaintiff's age and relative inexperience using a swing trainer, a reasonable person under the circumstances would have foreseen the risks associated with the activity. Ariana testified that the rules of using a swing trainer were simple, and the other children knew to stand back while one person swung the baseball bat. Another child testified that he instructed all of the children to stand back while Ariana was swinging the baseball bat; this indicates that other children present at the time of plaintiff's injury were aware of the danger of being struck by the baseball bat. Finally, the purpose of the swing trainer is to practice one's baseball swing, and swinging a baseball bat is inherent in the proper use of a swing trainer. A reasonable person could have foreseen that an injury could arise through the mechanism of swinging a baseball bat. For these reasons, plaintiff's injuries arose from inherent risks associated with using a swing trainer, and Ariana owed plaintiff a duty to refrain from acting in a reckless manner. Finally, we conclude that no genuine issue of material fact existed regarding whether Ariana acted recklessly: Ariana's actions, while careless, did not rise to the level of recklessness. Reckless misconduct has been described as follows: One who is properly charged with recklessness or wantonness is not simply more careless than one who is only guilty of negligence. His conduct must be such as to put him in the class with the wilful doer of wrong. The only respect in which his attitude is less blameworthy than that of the intentional wrongdoer is that, instead of affirmatively wishing to injure another, he is merely willing to do so. The difference is that between him who casts a missile intending that it shall strike another and him who casts it where he has reason to believe it will strike another, being indifferent whether it does so or not. [Behar v Fox, 249 Mich App 314, 319; 642 NW2d 426 (2001) (citation omitted).] -5- Stated differently, an individual's actions constitute reckless misconduct if an individual demonstrates a willingness or indifference to causing harm to another. The evidence of record reflects that Ariana did not look behind her before swinging the baseball bat. While a reasonable person could conclude that Ariana's decision to swing the baseball bat was careless, it does not rise to the level of willingness or indifference to causing harm to another. Indeed, Ariana testified that she saw plaintiff standing behind her before swinging the baseball bat and she believed that she was able to swing the baseball bat without hitting plaintiff or anyone else. Furthermore, Ariana was not indiscriminately swinging the baseball bat with others nearby. Rather, Ariana was doing so as part of the parties' collective decision to use the swing trainer. There was no evidence presented that Ariana swung the baseball bat with a willingness or indifference to strike another person. Accordingly, there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Ariana acted recklessly: she did not. Thus, the trial court did not err by granting summary disposition in favor of defendants with respect to plaintiff's claims against Ariana.