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On the U.S. Chemical Safety Board (CSB) website: https//www.csb.gov, find the information on November 17, 2003, DPC Enterprises chlorine release in Glendale, AZ. Read the CSB report

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The biggest causal factor leading to the release of chlorine gas was the fact that there were no engineering measures taken to ensure the chlorine could not overflow, specifically no indicators to show that there was even an overflow (an operator had to witness the scrubber itself to know something was wrong) and no system fail-safe to automatically stop the release (it is manual). The mechanical integrity of the machine was wholly fine, nothing broke or was damaged, so it was the system itself that was not completely thought through.

It should be noted that although the system had alarms set up to indicate the approximated percentage of excess caustic, the first and second alarms give no procedures for operators to shut off the chlorine flow. It's only until the third alarm goes off that there is a need to stop the flow, which in this case, it didn't.

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