This's a question in my assignment but I don't understand how to solve.

(6 points) Consider the following normal form game with two players: Player 2 L M R T (4, 1) (0,-1) (2,0) Player 1 (5,8) (-2,-2) (1,1) B (3,6) (2, 7) (4, 6) JS 2010 Assignment 5 (a) (2 points) Find all pure strategy Nash equilibria. (Hint: for any equilibrium that you find, report the strategies for each player. For example "Player 1 chooses M and Player 2 chooses R" is an acceptable way to describe an equilibrium. You may also use shorthand and say (M,R) is an equilibrium). (b) (2 points) Does Player 1 have any dominant strategies? If so, what are they? (c) (2 points) Does Player 1 have any dominated strategies? If so, what are they