Tort Law for Paralegals Chapter 13

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. V. Swartz, 2006

t No, ZUOSCAUOBG Court of Appeals of Ohio, Fih District, Richland County State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Swartz 2006 Ohio 2096 [Ohio Ct App 2006) Decided Apt 25 2006 No 2005CA0086, DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY' April 25, 2006, CiVIl Appeal From Richland County Court of Common Pleas, Case 04 CV 310. A fnried, Steven J, Zeehandelar, 471 East Broad Street, 12th Flr,, Columbus, OH 15069, for Plaintiff-Appellee, Eugene GGillis, 190 Montrnse West Avenue #100, Copley, OH 44321, for Defendant Appellant, Before: W, Scott Gwm, P,J,, Sheila G, Farmer, J,, Julie A, Edwards, J, m EDWARDS, J {1] l} Defendant-appellant Melvin R, Swanz appeals from the June 7, 2005, Judgment Entry of the Richland County Court of Common Pleas which entered judgment in favor of plaintiff- appellee State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company against appellant In the amount of $30,000.00. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE {1] 2} This case arises from a motor vehicle accident which occurred on March 25, 2002, in Manseld, Ohio, The accident involved three motor vehicles, One of the vehicles was driven by Billy J, Stamper, Stamper had an automobile casetext State Farm Mut. Auto. lns. Co. v. Swartz the issues of statutory and contractual subrogation However, the trial court overruled the motion for directed verdict on the issue of equitable subrogation Ultimately, the jury returned a verdict in favor of appellee in the amount of $30,000.00. The Judgment Entry on Jury Verdict was led on June 7, 2005, {1] S} It is from the June 7, 2005, Judgment Entry that appellant appeals, raising the folIoWIng assignments of error: {1] 6} I'I, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THIS ACTION PURSUANT TO THE CIVIL RULES FOR FAILURE TO NAME A NECESSARY AND INDISPENSABLE PARTY, {1] 7} "II, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED iN THIS MATTER BY NOT DIRECTING A VERDICT AS TO THE ITEMS OF PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGED DAMAGES WHICH WERE NOT SUPPORTED BY APPROPRIATE MEDICAL EVIDENCE AND DAMAGES NOT RECOERABLE [SIC], {1] 8} "III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DIRECTING THE VERDICT FOR THE DEFENDANT AND ALLOWING THIS CASE TO PROCEDD [SIC] TO JURY DECISION AS THE PLAINTIFF PRODUCED NO EVIDENCE OF A CONTRACT OR ANY OBLIGATION ON THE PLAINTIFF'S PART TO PAY THE DAMAGES AND ALLOWING EQUITABLE SUBROGATION AND THE PLAINTIFF TO RECOVER ON THAT INAPPROPRIATE insurance policy with State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company [hereinafter appellee], Appellant was driving one of the other vehicles, Appellant failed to stop his vehicle at a stop sign at an intersection and attempted to make a right hand turn onto another street, Appellant's vehicle was struck from behind by a southbound vehicle (the third vehicle involved) operated by Paul E, Temple, II, a non-party, After the impact, appellant's vehicle went left of center and stmck, head on, the motor vehicle operated by Stamper, According to appellee and Stamper, Stamper incurred serious bodily injury as a direct and proximate result of the impact, Stamper submitted a claim to State Farm State Farm paid $30,000,00 to/and on behalf of Mr, Stamper for personal injuries, {1] 3} On May 24, 2004, appellee led a complaint in the Richland County Court of Common Pleas. Appellee sought payment from appellant for the sum paid to Stamper claiming a right to subrogation, Subsequently, appellant filed a motion to dismiss alleging that appellee had failed to join an Indispensable party, namely, Temple, The trial coon overruled appellant's motion by a Judgment Entry led June 2, 2004, {1] 4} The case proceeded to trial on May 31, 2005, During the trial, appellant led a motion for directed verdict, In that motion, appellant contended that appellee failed to prove it had a right to subrogation because it failed to present Stamper's insurance policy or otherwise prove a right to subrogation of Stamper's claim, The trial court granted the motion for directed verdict on 2006 Ohio 2096 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006) {1] 10} An appellate court reviews motions to dismiss de novo, Plumbers Sleamtters Local Union 83 v. Union Local Sela Dist. Bd of Edn. (July 22, 1998), Belmont App, No, 97-BA40 (overniled on other grounds). It is according to that standard of review that we consider appellant's assignment ofenor, {1] 11} Civil Rule 19 prowdes for the joinder of persons needed for just adjudication and states in pertinent part as follows: {1] 12) I'(A) Persons to be joined if possible, "A person who is subject to sen/ice of process shall he joined as a party in the action if (I) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and Is so situated that the dispo5ition of the action in his absence may (a) as a practical matter impair or Impede his ability to protect that interest or (b) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise incon5istent obligations by reason of his it claimed interest , {1] 13} \"B) Determination by court whenever joinder not feasible, If a person as described in subdivision (A)(l), (2), or (3) hereof cannot be made a party, the court shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person being thus regarded as indispensable. The factors to be con5idered by the coun include: rst, to what extent a judgment rPnrtPrP/T m the nr-rcnn'c 5:chan- minbt hp CLAIM." 1 {1| 9} 1n the rst assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred when it failed to grant appellant's motion to dismiss for failure to name a necessary and indispensable party. We disagree. \\ // casetext ((4 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Swartz {1| 14} In other words, an indispensable party is one whose absence seriously prejudices any party to the action or prevents the court from rendering an effective judgment between the parties, or is one whose interests will be adversely affected or jeopardized by a judgment between the parties to the action. Layne v. Human (1974), 43 Ohio App2d 53, 333 N.E.2d 147. The Supreme Court of Ohio has recognized that dismissal pursuant to Civ. R. 19(B) is a harsh result which should be avoided when the defect can be cured. State ex rel. Bush v. Spurlock (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 7'7, 81, 537' N.E.2d 641. {1| [5} Appellant led a motion to dismiss in which appellant contended that the case had to be dismissed because Temple had not been named by appellee as a party to the action. Appellant asserted that it was his position that negligence by Temple was the "sole and proximate cause of the collision. Further, according to appellant, the statute of limitations in the matter had expired and Temple could no longer be held responsible. {1| [6} When the trial court denied appellant's motion to dismiss for failure to join a necessary party, it noted that a plaintiff is not required to sue all possible tortfeasors. lt instructed that if appellant wanted Temple in the case, appellant could le a third party complaint against Temple. The trial court was correct. Even if appellant is correct that the statute of limitations applicable to the collision has passed, the statute of limitations for ling a third party complaint is not the statute of limitations for the initial lawsuit. See anbardo u Calabrese (Nov. 4, 1982), Cuyahoga App. No. 44520, 1982 WL 2514. Generally, third party claims seek contribution or indemnication. The applicable statute of limitations for such claims does not begin to run against defendant (third party defendant) until judgment has been entered against the defendant, and perhaps not until the judgment has been paid by the defendant." 1d. However, appellant did not attempt to le a third party complaint against Temple. \\ // casetext (