Two buyers, B1 and B2, participate in an auction for an object. B1's value of the object is v1 = 100 and B2's value of the object is v2 = 40. Each buyer submits her bid in a sealed envelope. Let b1 [0,] be the B1' bid or B1's strategy. And let b2 [0, ] be the B2' bid or B2's strategy. Then the envelopes are opened and the object is given to the winner or whoever bids higher. If the bids are equal, then the object is given to bidder 1, i.e., B1 is the winner. The winner pays the price that is equal to the bid made by the loser. For example, if b1 = 90 and b2 = 200, then B2 is the winner and B2 pays 90. Given a pair of bids (b1, b2), the payoffs are given by u1(b1, b2) = v1 b2 if B1 is the winner and u1(b1, b2) = 0 otherwise. And u2(b1, b2) = v2 b1 if B2 is the winner and u2(b1, b2) = 0 otherwise. Find the best response function for B1 and B2. Find all the Nash equilibria.