Two countries (Country A and Country B) have had a long simmering territorial dispute over Fisland. At the moment, Fisland is unoccupied. The military leaders of each country greatly wants to occupy/militarize it, but that would mean risking war with the other country. Country A will make a decision to invade Fisland or not. If it invades, Country B can choose to defend it or retreat. If it chooses to defend, war breaks out and the result depends on who is stronger. Country A is either a Strong Type or Weak Type. Strong Country A can defeat Country B in a war, while Weak Country A will lose to Country B in a war. Country B believes that Country A is strong with probability 0.6. If Country A chooses not to invade, Country B has the option to invade or not invade. If Country B invades, then Country A will cede control of Fisland without a fight (even if Country A is a strong type).

How do we draw this form in extensive form. Label all nodes/moves/payoffs, etc

b) How do we Solve this game.

i) How many strategies does each player have. What are they? Are any dominated? ii) What strategy does each player play in equilibrium? Show in work. iii) What are the expected payouts for each country in equilibrium? Show inr work.