Two firms compete in a market to sell a homogeneous product with inverse demand function P: 600 30. Each rm produces at a constant marginal cost of $300 and has no fixed costs: Use this information to compare the output levels and profits in settings characterized by Cournot, Stackelberg, Bertrand, and collusive behavior. Instruction: Do not round intermediate calculations Round final answers to two decimal places for Cournot values' Cournot output for each firm: Cournot prots for each firm: $- \":7 Stackelberg leader output: 50 Stackelberg follower output: 21000 Stackelberg leader prots: $ Stackelberg follower prots: $ |:| Bertrand marketlevel output: 100 Bertrand prots for each firm: $ 0 Collusive marketlevel output: Collusive industrylevel profits: $ 21000