Two firms compete in a market to sell a homogeneous product with inverse demand function P = 600 - 3Q. Each firm produces at a constant marginal cost of $300 and has no fixed costs. Use this information to compare the output levels and profits in settings characterized by Cournot, Stackelberg, Bertrand, and collusive behavior.

Instruction: Do not round intermediate calculations. Round final answers to two decimal places for Cournot values.

Cournot output for each firm: ______

Cournot profits for each firm: $______

Stackelberg leader output:______

Stackelberg follower output: ______

Stackelberg leader profits: $______

Stackelberg follower profits: $______

Bertrand market-level output:______

Bertrand profits for each firm: $______

Collusive market-level output:______

Collusive industry-level profits: $______