Two firms compete in a market to sell a homogeneous product with inverse demand functionP = 400 - 2Q.Each firm produces at a constant marginal cost of $50 and has no fixed costs -- both firms have a cost functionC(Q) = 50Q.

If this market is defined as a Stackelberg Oligopoly, what is the optimal amount for the leader (firm 1) to produce? (Round to one decimal place)

Refer to the information above.

If this market is defined as a Stackelberg Oligopoly, what is the optimal amount for the follower (firm 2) to produce? (Round to one decimal place)

Refer to the information / answers above.

What is the market price? (Round to the nearest whole number)

Refer to the information / your answers above.

What are the leader's (firm 1's) profits? (Round to the nearest whole number)

Refer to the information / your answers above.

What are the follower's (firm 2's) profits? (Round to the nearest whole number)