Question
Two firms sell a standardized product in a Cournot oligopoly.The inverse demand for the market is P = 580 - 3Q where Q = (Q
Two firms sell a standardized product in aCournotoligopoly.The inverse demand for the market isP = 580 - 3QwhereQ = (Q1+ Q2).The cost functions areC1(Q1) = 4Q1andC2(Q2) = 4Q2. What is the optimal output level for firm 1?
Two firms compete in a market to sell a standardized product and the inverse demand in the market isP = 400 - QwhereQ = Q1+ Q2.The cost functions are:C1(Q1) = 8Q1andC2(Q2) = 36Q2.If this market is characterized by aStackelbergoligopoly, what is the optimal amount for the follower (firm 2) to produce?
Two firms compete in a market to sell a standardized product and the inverse demand in the market isP = 400 - QwhereQ = Q1+ Q2.The cost functions are:C1(Q1) = 8Q1andC2(Q2) = 36Q2.If this market is characterized by aStackelbergoligopoly, what is the optimal amount for the leader (firm 1) to produce?
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Valuing The Earth, Economics, Ecology, Ethics
Authors: Herman E Daly, Kenneth N Townsend
2nd Edition
0262540681, 9780262540681
