Two firms sell substitutable products; the market price is: P = 90 Q, where Q = Q1 + Q2 is the total market quantity, which consists of Q1 (the quantity produced by Firm 1) and Q2 (the quantity produced by Firm 2). The firms choose their quantities simultaneously. Firm 1's costs are C1 = 10 6Q1 + le. Firm 2's costs are C2 = Qg. Which standard game form does this model t best? O Bertrand. O Coordination game. 0 Cournot. O Prisoner's Dilemma. What is the payoff function for Firm 1? O 2 7T1 = 48 Q1 _ Q1Q2 _ 10- O 1 n1=48Q3 O 3 7:1 = 9601 -;Q12- (2102 10. 0 7T1 = 96Q1 _ Q1Q2