Two fishermen (Tom and Jerry) share a common fishing pond. They are considering whether to improve water quality, which costs 1000 dollars. With improved water quality, the profit of each of the fisherman will increase by 800 dollars. That is, if Tom makes the investment and Jerry does not, the net payoff is -200 dollars for Tom and 800 dollars for Jerry. If Jerry makes the investment, the net payoff is 800 dollars for Tom and -200 dollars for Jerry. If both of them decided to improve the water quality, they share the cost, each paying 500 dollars. The net benefit is 300 dollars for each. If neither makes the investment, the net payoff is zero for each. A. Write down the reduced form for this game if both firms make their decisions simultaneously. What is (are) the Nash equilibrium(s) in this problem? B. Is the Nash equilibrium Pareto efficient