Two neighboring homeowners,i = 1,2 , simultaneously choose how many hours If to spend maintaining a beautiful lawn. The avelage benefit per hour is 10li+12i The (opportunity) cost per hour for each is 4 for player 2. Suppose that player 1's opportunity cost is either 3 or 5 with equal probability and that this cost is player 1's private information. Homeowner i's average benet is increasing in the hours neighbor j spends on his own lawn because the appearance of one's property depends in part on the beauty of the surrounding neighborhood. Let [Ho be the amount of lawn maintenance for player 1 when his opportunity cost 5, and let ch be the amount of lawn maintenance for player 1 when his opportunity cost 3. The Bayseian-Nash equilibrium involves 113C = , in: = , and l; = The following graph shows the best response functions for player 2 two 3R2 , for player 1 when his opportunity cost is 5 BRHC and for player 1 when his opportunity cost is 3 BR\"; . Use the black point (plus symbol) to plot the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. 'lO Nash Equilibrium L2 UI When player 1 has an opportunity cost of 3 per hour, he would prefer to V his opportunity cost if he could. When player 1 has an opportunity cost of 5 per hour, he would prefer to V his opportunity cost if he could