Two people are involved in a dispute. Player 1 does not know whether player 2s type is strong or weak. Player 1 assigns probability p to player 2 being strong. Player 2 is fully informed. Each person can either Fight (F) or Yield (Y). The payoffs are as follows. Each player get 1/2 when both play Y but a player obtains 1 if she fights while her opponent yields (In this case the opponents get 0). When both fight, the payoffs are 1 for player 1 and -1 for player 2 when 2 is weak. The payoffs are reversed when player 2 is strong meaning that player 1 gets -1 and player 2 gets 1.

a) Represent this game using an extensive form.

b) Describe the BNE as a function of p.

c) Is it possible for all players to yield in a BNE? Explain. What does that imply about the occurrence of disputes?