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Question 4: [20 pts] Imagine three identical perfectly competitive firms, each with constant MC-2 and facing an industry inverse demand curve equal to P = 26 - Q. (a) Assume the three firms enter into a cartel agreement in which they agree to all set the monopoly price and share the monopoly profits three ways. If they do as promised, find the equilibrium price, the total industry profits and the profits received by each firm (Suppose Fixed Cost equals to 0 for all three firms). (b) Discuss that, in a one-shot game (i.e. the world ends after one period), each firm has an incentive to "cheat". That is, each firm would make more profit by lowering its price just below the monopoly level, conditional on its cartel partners still pricing at the monopoly level. (You only need to show this for one firm since the others are identical.) Conclude that cartels in one-shot games are inherently unstable