Use the following extensive-form game to answer the questions below. (60, 120) W A X (50, 50) B Y (0, 0) 2 (100, 150) a. For Player 1, which of the following are feasible strategies? For Player 2, which of the following are feasible strategies? b. Which of the following is/are the Nash equilibria to this game? c. What is the subgame perfect equilibrium? Explanation a. Player 1 has two feasible strategies: A or B. Player 2 has four feasible strategies: (1) W if A and Y if B; (2) X if A and Y if B; (3) W if A and Z if B; (4) X if A and Z if B. Of the ones listed, the correct answers then are W if A and Z if B. b. There are three Nash equilibria, listed as follows: (1) Player 1 plays A, and Player 2 plays W if A and Y if B, (2) Player 1 plays B, and Player 2 plays W if A and Z if B, (3) Player 1 plays B, and Player 2 plays X if A and Z if B. The first equilibrium results in payoffs of (60, 120). The last two equilibria each result in payoffs of (100, 150)