Use the following normal-form game to answer the questions below. 2 Player 2 Player 1 A 10 a. Identify the one-shot Nash equilibrium O (A,D) O (B.D) OAQ) O (B.Q) b. Suppose the players know this game will be repeated exactly three times. Can they achieve payoffs that are better than the one- shot Nash equilibrium? O Yes O No Support this gome is infinitely repeated and the interest rate is 6 percent. Can the players achieve payoffs that are better than the one shot Nash equilibrium? O Yer ONO d. Suppose the players do not know exactly how many times this game will be repeated, but they do know that the probability the gome will end after a given play is 6. If 0 is sufficiently low. can players eam more than they could in the one-shot Nash equilibrium? O NO O'Yes