Use the following normal-form game to answer the questions below. Player 2 Strategy C D A 40, 40 100, 15 Player 1 B 15, 100 55, 55 a. Identify the one-shot Nash equilibrium. O (A, C) O (B, D) O (A, D) O (B,C)b. Suppose the players know this game will be repeated exactly three times. Can they achieve payoffs that are better than the one-shot Nash equilibrium? O No O Yes c. Suppose this game is infinitely repeated and the interest rate is 8 percent. Can the players achieve payoffs that are better than the one-shot Nash equilibrium? O No O Yes c. Suppose this game is infinitely repeated and the interest rate is 8 percent. Can the players achieve payoffs that are better than the one-shot Nash equilibrium? O No O Yes d. Suppose the players do not know exactly how many times this game will be repeated, but they do know that the probability the game will end after a given play is B. If 8 is sufficiently low, can players earn more than they could in the one- shot Nash equilibrium? O No O Yes