Very struggled with the second question. Will the Bertrand equilibrium end up as a perfect competition equilibrium?

Question B-2 Consider an industry composed of only two firms, each producing an identical product, facing the inverse industry demand curve: P(Q) = 120 - 5Q with Q = 91 + 92 where Q represents industry output, q1 and q2 represent the outputs of firm 1 and firm 2 re- spectively, and p represents the industry price. The two firms have different cost of production. The cost function for Firm 1 is given by: C(q1) = 591 The cost function for Firm 2 is given by: C(92) = 10 q2 a) [7 marks] Determine the equilibrium price, individual firm output, and total indus- try output when the two firms behave as Cournot oligopolists, simultaneously choosing output. b) [3 marks] Determine the equilibrium price, individual firm output, and total industry output when the two firms behave as Bertrand oligopolists, simultaneously setting prices