View History Bookmarks Profiles Tab Window Help Q 2 . Thu Mar 16 7:08 PM Budget- LONG, DO X Mail - Madeline Galbraith - Out x Dzi Backstrom Worksheet v4 - CO. x Dzi. Comm172 Assignment 3 Due to X + rning.ca/d21/le/content/741295/viewContent/4608653/View de * [Update !) solus Events - Glean @ Organizational be.. Managerial Accou Question 3 Strategic Interaction among Firms Player I and Player 2 are considering whether to sign a contract or not. The resulting payoffs to each player for the alternative strategies are as follows, where X 2 0 and Z 2 0 are the non-negative parameters. Player 2 Sign Don't sign Player I Sign 15 + X, 15 +2 40, 18 Don't sign 18, 40 30, 30 a) Suppose X = Z =0, and assume that both players make their decisions simultaneously. Which firm has a dominant strategy (if any)? Find the Nash equilibrium for this game (if any). b) Find the values of X for which Sign is the maximin strategy for Player 1. For what values of Z is Don't sign the maximin strategy for Player 2? c) Now suppose X = Z = 5. As above, the players make their decisions simultaneously, but the game is now repeated. 1. If the game is played for 10 periods, what will be the resulting equilibrium? ii. Suppose neither player knows when the game will end, and Player I adopts a grim trigger strategy. At what level of the discount rate r will Player 2 the cooperative outcome be achieved? Explain. 1) Now suppose X = Z = 2, and assume that Player 2 makes its decision before Player 1. Write down the extensive form of the sequential game. Identify all Nash equilibria (if any) in this game. Does Player 2 have a first-mover advantage? Explain. iload Print M 16 20 KK DII A F3 F10 F11 F12 3 6 delete E R T Y U O D F G H K