We consider the following two-player strategic form game, where Alice's strategies are U and D, and Bob's strategies are L and R. The payoffs are given in the Table below. What is the lowest discount factor for Bobsuch that Alice and Bob play the profile (U,R) at each period when that game is repeated an infinite number of times? (Round your answer to the 3rd decimal). We are interested in the minimal value of the discount factor such that Bob does not want to deviate from (U,R) when Alice uses a grim trigger strategy. So you need to find under which conditions Bob does not want to deviate (i.e., you don't need to check whether Alice wants to deviate). Important remark: If you find must be lower than some negativenumber (meaning that no matter what, Bob always wants to deviate), then put 0 in your answer. Similarly, if you find that must be greater than some number greater than 1 (meaning that no matter what, Bob never wants to deviate), then put 1 in your answer. We consider the following two-player strategic form game, where Alice's strategies are U and D, and Bob's strategies are L and R. The payoffs are given in the Table below. What is the lowest discount factor for Bobsuch that Alice and Bob play the profile (U,R) at each period when that game is repeated an infinite number of times? (Round your answer to the 3rd decimal). We are interested in the minimal value of the discount factor such that Bob does not want to deviate from (U,R) when Alice uses a grim trigger strategy. So you need to find under which conditions Bob does not want to deviate (i.e., you don't need to check whether Alice wants to deviate). Important remark: If you find must be lower than some negativenumber (meaning that no matter what, Bob always wants to deviate), then put 0 in your answer. Similarly, if you find that must be greater than some number greater than 1 (meaning that no matter what, Bob never wants to deviate), then put 1 in your