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We proved that second-price auctions are DSIC under the assumption that every bidder's utility function is quasilinear, with the utility of a bidder with valuation
We proved that second-price auctions are DSIC under the assumption that every bidder's utility function is quasilinear, with the utility of a bidder with valuation vi winning the item at price p given by vi p. Identify significantly weaker assumptions on bidders' utility functions under which truthful bidding remains a dominant strategy for every bidder
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