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Supreme Court of the United States April 25, 2022, Argued; June 27, 2022, Decided No. 21-418. Reporter 2022 U.S. LEXIS 3218 * JOSEPH A. KENNEDY, PETITIONER v. BREMERTON SCHOOL DISTRICT Notice: The pagination of this document is subject to change pending release of the final published version. Prior History: [*1] ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 991 F.3d 1004, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 7911, 2021 WL 1032847 (9th Cir. Wash., Mar. 18, 2021) Disposition: 991 F. 3d 1004, reversed. Syllabus Petitioner Joseph Kennedy lost his job as a high school football coach in the Bremerton School District after he knelt at midfield after games to offer a quiet personal prayer. Mr. Kennedy sued in federal court, alleging that the District's actions violated the First Amendment's Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses. He also moved for a preliminary injunction requiring the District to reinstate him. The District Court denied that motion, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. After the parties engaged in discovery, they filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The District Court found that the "'sole reason'" for the District's decision to suspend Mr. Kennedy was its perceived "risk of constitutional liability" under the Establishment Clause for his "religious conduct" after three games in October 2015. 443 F. Supp. 3d 1223, 1231. The District Court granted summary judgment to the District and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Ninth Circuit denied a petition to rehear the case en banc over the dissents of 11 judges. 4 F. 4th 910, 911. Several dissenters argued that the panel applied a flawed understanding of the Establishment Clause reflected in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 91 S. Ct. 2105, 29 L. Ed. 2d 745, and that this Court has abandoned Lemon's "ahistorical, atextual" approach to discerning Establishment Clause violations. [*2] 4 F. 4th, at 911, and n. 3. Held: The Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment protect an individual engaging in a personal religious observance from government reprisal; the Constitution neither mandates nor permits the government to suppress such religious expression. Pp. 11-32. (a) Mr. Kennedy contends that the District's conduct violated both the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment. Where the Free Exercise Clause protects religious exercises, the Free Speech Clause provides overlapping protection for expressive religious activities. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263, 269, n. 6, 102 S. Ct. 269, 70 L. Ed. 2d 440. A plaintiff must demonstrate an infringement of his rights under the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses. If the plaintiff carries his or her burden, the defendant must show that its actions were nonetheless justified and appropriately tailored. Pp. 11-30. (1) Mr. Kennedy discharged his burden under the Free Exercise Clause. The Court's precedents permit a plaintiff to demonstrate a free exercise violation multiple ways, including by showing that a government entity has burdened his sincere religious practice pursuant to a policy that is not "neutral" or "generally applicable." Employment Div., Dept. of Human Page 2 of 32 Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872, 879-881, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 108 L. Ed. 2d 876. Failing either the neutrality or general applicability test is sufficient to trigger strict scrutiny, under which the government must demonstrate its course was justified by a compelling state [*3] interest and was narrowly tailored in pursuit of that interest. See, e.g., Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520, 546, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 124 L. Ed. 2d 472. Here, no one questions that Mr. Kennedy seeks to engage in a sincerely motivated religious exercise involving giving "thanks through prayer" briefly "on the playing field" at the conclusion of each game he coaches. App. 168, 171. The contested exercise here does not involve leading prayers with the team; the District disciplined Mr. Kennedy only for his decision to persist in praying quietly without his students after three games in October 2015. In forbidding Mr. Kennedy's brief prayer, the District's challenged policies were neither neutral nor generally applicable. By its own admission, the District sought to restrict Mr. Kennedy's actions at least in part because of their religious character. Prohibiting a religious practice was thus the District's unquestioned "object." The District explained that it could not allow an on-duty employee to engage in religious conduct even though it allowed other on-duty employees to engage in personal secular conduct. The District's performance evaluation after the 2015 football season also advised against rehiring Mr. Kennedy on the ground that he failed to supervise student-athletes [*4] after games, but any sort of postgame supervisory requirement was not applied in an evenhanded way. Pp. 12-14. The District thus conceded that its policies were neither neutral nor generally applicable. (2) Mr. Kennedy also discharged his burden under the Free Speech Clause. The First Amendment's protections extend to "teachers and students," neither of whom "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U. S. 503, 506, 89 S. Ct. 733, 21 L. Ed. 2d 731. But teachers and coaches are also government employees paid in part to speak on the government's behalf and to convey its intended messages. To account for the complexity associated with the interplay between free speech rights and government employment, this Court's decisions in Pickering v. Board of Ed. of Township High School Dist. 205, Will Cty., 391 U. S. 563, 88 S. Ct. 1731, 20 L. Ed. 2d 811, and Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U. S. 410, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 164 L. Ed. 2d 689, and related cases suggest proceeding in two steps. The first step involves a threshold inquiry into the nature of the speech at issue. When an employee "speaks as a citizen addressing a matter of public concern," the Court's cases indicate that the First Amendment may be implicated and courts should proceed to a second step. Id., at 423, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 164 L. Ed. 2d 689. At this step, courts should engage in "a delicate balancing of the competing interests surrounding the speech and its consequences." Ibid. At the first step of the Pickering-Garcetti [*5] inquiry, the parties' disagreement centers on one question: Did Mr. Kennedy offer his prayers in his capacity as a private citizen, or did they amount to government speech attributable to the District? When Mr. Kennedy uttered the three prayers that resulted in his suspension, he was not engaged in speech "ordinarily within the scope" of his duties as a coach. Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228, 240, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 189 L. Ed. 2d 312. He did not speak pursuant to government policy and was not seeking to convey a government-created message. He was not instructing players, discussing strategy, encouraging better on-field performance, or engaged in any other speech the District paid him to produce as a coach. Simply put: Mr. Kennedy's prayers did not "ow[e their] existence" to Mr. Kennedy's responsibilities as a public employee. Garcetti, 547 U. S., at 421, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 164 L. Ed. 2d 689. The timing and circumstances of Mr. Kennedy's prayersduring the postgame period when coaches were free to attend briefly to personal matters and students were engaged in other activitiesconfirms that Mr. Kennedy did not offer his prayers while acting within the scope of his duties as a coach. It is not dispositive that Coach Kennedy served as a role model and remained on duty after games. To hold otherwise is to posit an "excessively [*6] broad job descriptio[n]" by treating everything teachers and coaches say in the workplace as government speech subject to government control. Garcetti, 547 U. S., at 424, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 164 L. Ed. 2d 689. That Mr. Kennedy used available time to pray does not transform his speech into government speech. Acknowledging that Mr. Kennedy's prayers represented his own private speech means he has carried his threshold burden. Under the Pickering-Garcetti framework, a second step remains where the government may seek to prove that its interests as employer outweigh even an employee's private speech on a matter of public concern. See Lane, 573 U. S., at 242, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 189 L. Ed. 2d 312. Pp. 15-19. (3) Whether one views the case through the lens of the Free Exercise or Free Speech Clause, at this point the burden shifts to the District. Under the Free Exercise Clause, a government entity normally must satisfy at least "strict scrutiny," showing that its restrictions on the plaintiff's protected rights serve a compelling interest and are narrowly tailored to that end. See Lukumi, 508 U. S., at 533, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 124 L. Ed. 2d 472. A similar standard generally obtains under the Free Speech Clause. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U. S. 155, 171, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 192 L. Ed. 2d 236. The District asks the Court to apply to Mr. 2022 U.S. LEXIS 3218, *2 Page 3 of 32 Kennedy's claims the more lenient second-step Pickering-Garcetti test, or alternatively, intermediate scrutiny. The Court concludes, however, that the District cannot sustain its burden under [*7] any standard. Pp. 19-30. i. The District, like the Ninth Circuit below, insists Mr. Kennedy's rights to religious exercise and free speech must yield to the District's interest in avoiding an Establishment Clause violation under Lemon and its progeny. The Lemon approach called for an examination of a law's purposes, effects, and potential for entanglement with religion. Lemon, 403 U. S., at 612-613, 91 S. Ct. 2105, 29 L. Ed. 2d 745. In time, that approach also came to involve estimations about whether a "reasonable observer" would consider the government's challenged action an "endorsement" of religion. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U. S. 573, 593, 109 S. Ct. 3086, 106 L. Ed. 2d 472. Butgiven the apparent "shortcomings" associated with Lemon's "ambitiou[s]," abstract, and ahistorical approach to the Establishment Clausethis Court long ago abandoned Lemon and its endorsement test offshoot. American Legion v. American Humanist Assn., 588 U. S. ___, ___, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 204 L. Ed. 2d 452 (plurality opinion). In place of Lemon and the endorsement test, this Court has instructed that the Establishment Clause must be interpreted by "'reference to historical practices and understandings.'" Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U. S. 565, 576, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 188 L. Ed. 2d 835. A natural reading of the First Amendment suggests that the Clauses have "complementary" purposes, not warring ones where one Clause is always sure to prevail over the others. Everson v. Board of Ed. of Ewing, 330 U. S. 1, 13, 15, 67 S. Ct. 504, 91 L. Ed. 711. An analysis focused on original meaning and history, this Court has stressed, has long represented the rule rather than some "'exception'" within the "Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence." [*8] Town of Greece, at 575, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 188 L. Ed. 2d 835. The District and the Ninth Circuit erred by failing to heed this guidance. Pp. 19-30. ii. The District next attempts to justify its suppression of Mr. Kennedy's religious activity by arguing that doing otherwise would coerce students to pray. The Ninth Circuit did not adopt this theory in proceedings below and evidence of coercion in this record is absent. The District suggests that any visible religious conduct by a teacher or coach should be deemedwithout more and as a matter of lawimpermissibly coercive on students. A rule that the only acceptable government role models for students are those who eschew any visible religious expression would undermine a long constitutional tradition in which learning how to tolerate diverse expressive activities has always been "part of learning how to live in a pluralistic society." Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 590, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 120 L. Ed. 2d 467. No historically sound understanding of the Establishment Clause begins to "mak[e] it necessary for government to be hostile to religion" in this way. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 306, 314. Pp. 24-30, 72 S. Ct. 679, 96 L. Ed. 954. iii. There is no conflict between the constitutional commands of the First Amendment in this case. There is only the "mere shadow" of a conflict, a false choice premised on a misconstruction of the Establishment Clause. School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 308, 83 S. Ct. 1560, 10 L. Ed. 2d 844 (Goldberg, J., concurring). A government entity's [*9] concerns about phantom constitutional violations do not justify actual violations of an individual's First Amendment rights. Pp. 30-31. (c) Respect for religious expressions is indispensable to life in a free and diverse Republic. Here, a government entity sought to punish an individual for engaging in a personal religious observance, based on a mistaken view that it has a duty to suppress religious observances even as it allows comparable secular speech. The Constitution neither mandates nor tolerates that kind of discrimination. Mr. Kennedy is entitled to summary judgment on his religious exercise and free speech claims. Pp. 31-32. 991 F. 3d 1004, reversed. Counsel: Paul D. Clement argued the cause for petitioner. Richard B. Katskee argued the cause for respondents. Judges: Gorsuch, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Thomas, Alito, and Barrett, JJ., joined, and in which Kavanaugh, J., joined, except as to Part III-B. Thomas , J., and Alito, J., filed concurring opinions. Sotomayor, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Breyer and Kagan, JJ., joined. 2022 U.S. LEXIS 3218, *6 Page 4 of 32 Opinion by: GORSUCH Opinion JUSTICE GORSUCH delivered the opinion of the Court. Joseph Kennedy lost his job as a high school football coach because he knelt at midfield after games to offer a quiet prayer of thanks. Mr. Kennedy prayed during a period when school employees [*10] were free to speak with a friend, call for a reservation at a restaurant, check email, or attend to other personal matters. He offered his prayers quietly while his students were otherwise occupied. Still, the Bremerton School District disciplined him anyway. It did so because it thought anything less could lead a reasonable observer to conclude (mistakenly) that it endorsed Mr. Kennedy's religious beliefs. That reasoning was misguided. Both the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment protect expressions like Mr. Kennedy's. Nor does a proper understanding of the Amendment's Establishment Clause require the government to single out private religious speech for special disfavor. The Constitution and the best of our traditions counsel mutual respect and tolerance, not censorship and suppression, for religious and nonreligious views alike. I A Joseph Kennedy began working as a football coach at Bremerton High School in 2008 after nearly two decades of service in the Marine Corps. App. 167. Like many other football players and coaches across the country, Mr. Kennedy made it a practice to give "thanks through prayer on the playing field" at the conclusion of each game. Id., at 168, 171. In his prayers, Mr. Kennedy sought to express gratitude [*11] for "what the players had accomplished and for the opportunity to be part of their lives through the game of football." Id., at 168. Mr. Kennedy offered his prayers after the players and coaches had shaken hands, by taking a knee at the 50-yard line and praying "quiet[ly]" for "approximately 30 seconds." Id., at 168-169. Initially, Mr. Kennedy prayed on his own. See ibid. But over time, some players asked whether they could pray alongside him. 991 F. 3d 1004, 1010 (CA9 2021); App. 169. Mr. Kennedy responded by saying, "'This is a free country. You can do what you want.'" Ibid. The number of players who joined Mr. Kennedy eventually grew to include most of the team, at least after some games. Sometimes team members invited opposing players to join. Other times Mr. Kennedy still prayed alone. See ibid. Eventually, Mr. Kennedy began incorporating short motivational speeches with his prayer when others were present. See id., at 170. Separately, the team at times engaged in pregame or postgame prayers in the locker room. It seems this practice was a "school tradition" that predated Mr. Kennedy's tenure. Ibid. Mr. Kennedy explained that he "never told any student that it was important they participate in any religious [*12] activity." Ibid. In particular, he "never pressured or encouraged any student to join" his postgame midfield prayers. Ibid. For over seven years, no one complained to the Bremerton School District (District) about these practices. See id., at 63-64. It seems the District's superintendent first learned of them only in September 2015, after an employee from another school commented positively on the school's practices to Bremerton's principal. See id., at 109, 229. At that point, the District reacted quickly. On September 17, the superintendent sent Mr. Kennedy a letter. In it, the superintendent identified "two problematic practices" in which Mr. Kennedy had engaged. App. 40. First, Mr. Kennedy had provided "inspirational talk[s]" that included "overtly religious references" likely constituting "prayer" with the students "at midfield following the completion of . . . game[s]." Ibid. Second, he had led "students and coaching staff in a prayer" in the locker-room tradition that "predated [his] involvement with the program." Id., at 41. The District explained that it sought to establish "clear parameters" "going forward." Ibid. It instructed Mr. Kennedy to avoid any motivational "talks with [*13] students" that "include[d] religious expression, including prayer," and to avoid "suggest[ing], encourag[ing] (or discourag[ing]), or supervis[ing]" any prayers of students, which students remained free to "engage in." Id., at 44. The District also explained that any religious activity on Mr. Kennedy's part must be "nondemonstrative (i.e., not outwardly discernible as religious activity)" if "students are also engaged in religious conduct" in order to "avoid the perception of endorsement." Id., at 45. In offering these directives, the District appealed to what it called a "direct tension 2022 U.S. LEXIS 3218, *9 Page 5 of 32 between" the "Establishment Clause" and "a school employee's [right to] free[ly] exercise" his religion. Id., at 43. To resolve that "tension," the District explained, an employee's free exercise rights "must yield so far as necessary to avoid school endorsement of religious activities." Ibid. After receiving the District's September 17 letter, Mr. Kennedy ended the tradition, predating him, of offering locker-room prayers. Id., at 40-41, 77, 170-172. He also ended his practice of incorporating religious references or prayer into his postgame motivational talks to his team on the field. See ibid. Mr. Kennedy further felt [*14] pressured to abandon his practice of saying his own quiet, on-field postgame prayer. See id., at 172. Driving home after a game, however, Mr. Kennedy felt upset that he had "broken [his] commitment to God" by not offering his own prayer, so he turned his car around and returned to the field. Ibid. By that point, everyone had left the stadium, and he walked to the 50-yard line and knelt to say a brief prayer of thanks. See ibid. On October 14, through counsel, Mr. Kennedy sent a letter to school officials informing them that, because of his "sincerelyheld religious beliefs," he felt "compelled" to offer a "post-game personal prayer" of thanks at midfield. Id., at 62-63, 172. He asked the District to allow him to continue that "private religious expression" alone. Id., at 62. Consistent with the District's policy, see id., at 48, Mr. Kennedy explained that he "neither requests, encourages, nor discourages students from participating in" these prayers, id., at 64. Mr. Kennedy emphasized that he sought only the opportunity to "wai[t] until the game is over and the players have left the field and then wal[k] to mid-field to say a short, private, personal prayer." Id., at 69. He "told everybody" [*15] that it would be acceptable to him to pray "when the kids went away from [him]." Id., at 292. He later clarified that this meant he was even willing to say his "prayer while the players were walking to the locker room" or "bus," and then catch up with his team. Id., at 280-282; see also id., at 59. However, Mr. Kennedy objected to the logical implication of the District's September 17 letter, which he understood as banning him "from bowing his head" in the vicinity of students, and as requiring him to "flee the scene if students voluntarily [came] to the same area" where he was praying. Id., at 70. After all, District policy prohibited him from "discourag[ing]" independent student decisions to pray. Id., at 44. On October 16, shortly before the game that day, the District responded with another letter. See id., at 76. The District acknowledged that Mr. Kennedy "ha[d] complied" with the "directives" in its September 17 letter. Id., at 77. Yet instead of accommodating Mr. Kennedy's request to offer a brief prayer on the field while students were busy with other activities whether heading to the locker room, boarding the bus, or perhaps singing the school fight songthe District issued [*16] an ultimatum. It forbade Mr. Kennedy from engaging in "any overt actions" that could "appea[r] to a reasonable observer to endorse . . . prayer . . . while he is on duty as a District-paid coach." Id., at 81. The District did so because it judged that anything less would lead it to violate the Establishment Clause. Ibid. B After receiving this letter, Mr. Kennedy offered a brief prayer following the October 16 game. See id., at 90. When he bowed his head at midfield after the game, "most [Bremerton] players were . . . engaged in the traditional singing of the school fight song to the audience." Ibid. Though Mr. Kennedy was alone when he began to pray, players from the other team and members of the community joined him before he finished his prayer. See id., at 82, 297. This event spurred media coverage of Mr. Kennedy's dilemma and a public response from the District. The District placed robocalls to parents to inform them that public access to the field is forbidden; it posted signs and made announcements at games saying the same thing; and it had the Bremerton Police secure the field in future games. Id., at 100-101, 354-355. Subsequently, the District superintendent explained in an October 20 email to [*17] the leader of a state association of school administrators that "the coach moved on from leading prayer with kids, to taking a silent prayer at the 50 yard line." Id., at 83. The official with whom the superintendent corresponded acknowledged that the "use of a silent prayer changes the equation a bit." Ibid. On October 21, the superintendent further observed to a state official that "[t]he issue is quickly changing as it has shifted from leading prayer with student athletes, to a coaches [sic] right to conduct" his own prayer "on the 50 yard line." Id., at 88. On October 23, shortly before that evening's game, the District wrote Mr. Kennedy again. It expressed "appreciation" for his "efforts to comply" with the District's directives, including avoiding "on-the-job prayer with players in the . . . football program, both in the locker room prior to games as well as on the field immediately following games." Id., at 90. The letter also admitted that, during Mr. Kennedy's recent October 16 postgame prayer, his students were otherwise engaged and not praying with him, and that his prayer was "fleeting." Id., at 90, 93. Still, the District explained that a "reasonable observer" could 2022 U.S. LEXIS 3218, *13 Page 6 of 32 think [*18] government endorsement of religion had occurred when a "District employee, on the field only by virtue of his employment with the District, still on duty" engaged in "overtly religious conduct." Id., at 91, 93. The District thus made clear that the only option it would offer Mr. Kennedy was to allow him to pray after a game in a "private location" behind closed doors and "not observable to students or the public." Id., at 93-94. After the October 23 game ended, Mr. Kennedy knelt at the 50-yard line, where "no one joined him," and bowed his head for a "brief, quiet prayer." 991 F. 3d, at 1019; App. 173, 236-239. The superintendent informed the District's board that this prayer "moved closer to what we want," but nevertheless remained "unconstitutional." Id., at 96. After the final relevant football game on October 26, Mr. Kennedy again knelt alone to offer a brief prayer as the players engaged in postgame traditions. 443 F. Supp. 3d 1223, 1231 (WD Wash. 2020); App. to Pet. for Cert. 182. While he was praying, other adults gathered around him on the field. See 443 F. Supp. 3d, at 1231; App. 97. Later, Mr. Kennedy rejoined his players for a postgame talk, after they had finished singing the school fight song. 443 F. Supp. 3d, at 1231; App. 103. C Shortly after the October 26 game, the District placed Mr. [*19] Kennedy on paid administrative leave and prohibited him from "participat[ing], in any capacity, in . . . football program activities." Ibid. In a letter explaining the reasons for this disciplinary action, the superintendent criticized Mr. Kennedy for engaging in "public and demonstrative religious conduct while still on duty as an assistant coach" by offering a prayer following the games on October 16, 23, and 26. Id., at 102. The letter did not allege that Mr. Kennedy performed these prayers with students, and it acknowledged that his prayers took place while students were engaged in unrelated postgame activities. Id., at 103. Additionally, the letter faulted Mr. Kennedy for not being willing to pray behind closed doors. Id., at 102. In an October 28 Q&A document provided to the public, the District admitted that it possessed "no evidence that students have been directly coerced to pray with Kennedy." Id., at 105. The Q&A also acknowledged that Mr. Kennedy "ha[d] complied" with the District's instruction to refrain from his "prior practices of leading players in a pre-game prayer in the locker room or leading players in a post-game prayer immediately following games." Ibid. But the [*20] Q&A asserted that the District could not allow Mr. Kennedy to "engage in a public religious display." Id., at 105, 107, 110. Otherwise, the District would "violat[e] the . . . Establishment Clause" because "reasonable . . . students and attendees" might perceive the "district [as] endors[ing] . . . religion." Id., at 105. While Mr. Kennedy received "uniformly positive evaluations" every other year of his coaching career, after the 2015 season ended in November, the District gave him a poor performance evaluation. Kennedy v. Bremerton School Dist., 869 F. 3d 813, 820 (CA9 2017). The evaluation advised against rehiring Mr. Kennedy on the grounds that he "'failed to follow district policy'" regarding religious expression and "'failed to supervise student-athletes after games.'" Ibid. Mr. Kennedy did not return for the next season. Ibid. II A After these events, Mr. Kennedy sued in federal court, alleging that the District's actions violated the First Amendment's Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses. App. 145, 160-164. He also moved for a preliminary injunction requiring the District to reinstate him. The District Court denied that motion, concluding that a "reasonable observer . . . would have seen him as . . . leading an orchestrated session of faith." App. to Pet. for Cert. 303. Indeed, if the District had not suspended him, [*21] the court agreed, it might have violated the Constitution's Establishment Clause. See id., at 302-303. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Kennedy, 869 F. 3d, at 831. Following the Ninth Circuit's ruling, Mr. Kennedy sought certiorari in this Court. The Court denied the petition. But JUSTICE ALITO, joined by three other Members of the Court, issued a statement stressing that "denial of certiorari does not signify that the Court necessarily agrees with the decision . . . below." Kennedy v. Bremerton School Dist., 586 U. S. ___, ___, 139 S. Ct. 634, 203 L. Ed. 2d 137 (2019) (slip op., at 1). JUSTICE ALITO expressed concerns with the lower courts' decisions, including the possibility that, under their reasoning, teachers might be "ordered not to engage in any 'demonstrative' conduct of a religious 2022 U.S. LEXIS 3218, *17 Page 7 of 32 nature" within view of students, even to the point of being forbidden from "folding their hands or bowing their heads in prayer" before lunch. Id., at ___, 139 S. Ct. 634, 203 L. Ed. 2d 137 (slip op., at 4). B After the case returned to the District Court, the parties engaged in discovery and eventually brought cross-motions for summary judgment. At the end of that process, the District Court found that the "'sole reason'" for the District's decision to suspend Mr. Kennedy was its perceived "risk of constitutional liability" under the Establishment Clause for his "religious conduct" after the October 16, 23, and [*22] 26 games. 443 F. Supp. 3d, at 1231. The court found that reason persuasive too. Rejecting Mr. Kennedy's free speech claim, the court concluded that because Mr. Kennedy "was hired precisely to occupy" an "influential role for student athletes," any speech he uttered was offered in his capacity as a government employee and unprotected by the First Amendment. Id., at 1237. Alternatively, even if Mr. Kennedy's speech qualified as private speech, the District Court reasoned, the District properly suppressed it. Had it done otherwise, the District would have invited "an Establishment Clause violation." Ibid. Turning to Mr. Kennedy's free exercise claim, the District Court held that, even if the District's policies restricting his religious exercise were not neutral toward religion or generally applicable, the District had a compelling interest in prohibiting his postgame prayers, because, once more, had it "allow[ed]" them it "would have violated the Establishment Clause." Id., at 1240. C The Ninth Circuit affirmed. It agreed with the District Court that Mr. Kennedy's speech qualified as government rather than private speech because "his expression on the fielda location that he only had access to because of his employmentduring a time when he was generally tasked with communicating with students, [*23] was speech as a government employee." 991 F. 3d, at 1015. Like the District Court, the Ninth Circuit further reasoned that, "even if we were to assume . . . that Kennedy spoke as a private citizen," the District had an "adequate justification" for its actions. Id., at 1016. According to the court, "Kennedy's on-field religious activity," coupled with what the court called "his pugilistic efforts to generate publicity in order to gain approval of those on-field religious activities," were enough to lead an "objective observer" to conclude that the District "endorsed Kennedy's religious activity by not stopping the practice." Id., at 1017-1018. And that, the court held, would amount to a violation of the Establishment Clause. Ibid. The Court of Appeals rejected Mr. Kennedy's free exercise claim for similar reasons. The District "concede[d]" that its policy that led to Mr. Kennedy's suspension was not "neutral and generally applicable" and instead "restrict[ed] Kennedy's religious conduct because the conduct [was] religious." Id., at 1020. Still, the court ruled, the District "had a compelling state interest to avoid violating the Establishment Clause," and its suspension was narrowly tailored to vindicate that interest. Id., at 1020-1021. Later, the Ninth Circuit denied a petition to rehear the case [*24] en banc over the dissents of 11 judges. 4 F. 4th 910, 911 (2021). Among other things, the dissenters argued that the panel erred by holding that a failure to discipline Mr. Kennedy would have led the District to violate the Establishment Clause. Several dissenters noted that the panel's analysis rested on Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 91 S. Ct. 2105, 29 L. Ed. 2d 745 (1971), and its progeny for the proposition that the Establishment Clause is implicated whenever a hypothetical reasonable observer could conclude the government endorses religion. 4 F. 4th, at 945-947 (opinion of R. Nelson, J.). These dissenters argued that this Court has long since abandoned that "ahistorical, atextual" approach to discerning "Establishment Clause violations"; they observed that other courts around the country have followed suit by renouncing it too; and they contended that the panel should have likewise "recognized Lemon's demise and wisely left it dead." Ibid., and n. 3. We granted certiorari. 595 U. S. ___ (2022). III Now before us, Mr. Kennedy renews his argument that the District's conduct violated both the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment. These Clauses work in tandem. Where the Free Exercise Clause protects religious exercises, whether communicative or not, the Free Speech Clause provides overlapping protection for expressive religious activities. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263, 269, n. 6, 102 S. Ct. 269, 70 L. Ed. 2d 440 (1981); Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 819, 841, 115 S. Ct. 2510, 132 L. Ed. 2d 700 (1995). That the First Amendment doubly protects religious speech is no accident. It is a natural outgrowth [*25] of the framers' distrust of government attempts to regulate 2022 U.S. LEXIS 3218, *21 Page 8 of 32 religion and suppress dissent. See, e.g., A Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in Selected Writings of James Madison 21, 25 (R. Ketcham ed. 2006). "[I]n Anglo-American history, . . . government suppression of speech has so commonly been directed precisely at religious speech that a free-speech clause without religion would be Hamlet without the prince." Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U. S. 753, 760, 115 S. Ct. 2440, 132 L. Ed. 2d 650 (1995). Under this Court's precedents, a plaintiff bears certain burdens to demonstrate an infringement of his rights under the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses. If the plaintiff carries these burdens, the focus then shifts to the defendant to show that its actions were nonetheless justified and tailored consistent with the demands of our case law. See, e.g., Fulton v. Philadelphia, 593 U. S. ___, ___-___, ___, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 210 L. Ed. 2d 137 (2021) (slip op., at 4-5, 13); Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U. S. 155, 171, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 192 L. Ed. 2d 236 (2015); Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U. S. 410, 418, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 164 L. Ed. 2d 689 (2006); Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520, 546, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 124 L. Ed. 2d 472 (1993); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398, 403, 83 S. Ct. 1790, 10 L. Ed. 2d 965 (1963). We begin by examining whether Mr. Kennedy has discharged his burdens, first under the Free Exercise Clause, then under the Free Speech Clause. A The Free Exercise Clause provides that "Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise" of religion. Amdt. 1. This Court has held the Clause applicable to the States under the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303, 60 S. Ct. 900, 84 L. Ed. 1213 (1940). The Clause protects not only the right to harbor religious beliefs inwardly and secretly. It does [*26] perhaps its most important work by protecting the ability of those who hold religious beliefs of all kinds to live out their faiths in daily life through "the performance of (or abstention from) physical acts." Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872, 877, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 108 L. Ed. 2d 876 (1990). Under this Court's precedents, a plaintiff may carry the burden of proving a free exercise violation in various ways, including by showing that a government entity has burdened his sincere religious practice pursuant to a policy that is not "neutral" or "generally applicable." Id., at 879-881, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 108 L. Ed. 2d 876. Should a plaintiff make a showing like that, this Court will find a First Amendment violation unless the government can satisfy "strict scrutiny" by demonstrating its course was justified by a compelling state interest and was narrowly tailored in pursuit of that interest. Lukumi, 508 U. S., at 546, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 124 L. Ed. 2d 472. 1 That Mr. Kennedy has discharged his burdens is effectively undisputed. No one questions that he seeks to engage in a sincerely motivated religious exercise. The exercise in question involves, as Mr. Kennedy has put it, giving "thanks through prayer" briefly and by himself "on the playing field" at the conclusion of each game he coaches. App. 168, 171. Mr. Kennedy has indicated repeatedly that he is willing to "wai[t] until the game is over [*27] and the players have left the field" to "wal[k] to mid-field to say [his] short, private, personal prayer." Id., at 69; see also id., at 280, 282. The contested exercise before us does not involve leading prayers with the team or before any other captive audience. Mr. Kennedy's "religious beliefs do not require [him] to lead any prayer . . . involving students." Id., at 170. At the District's request, he voluntarily discontinued the school tradition of locker-room prayers and his postgame religious talks to students. The District disciplined him only for his decision to persist in praying quietly without his players after three games in October 2015. See Parts I-B and I-C, supra. Nor does anyone question that, in forbidding Mr. Kennedy's brief prayer, the District failed to act pursuant to a neutral and generally applicable rule. A government policy will not qualify as neutral if it is "specifically directed at . . . religious practice." Smith, 494 U. S., at 878, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 108 L. Ed. 2d 876. A policy can fail this test if it "discriminate[s] on its face," or if a religious exercise is otherwise its "object." Lukumi, 508 U. S., at 533, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 124 L. Ed. 2d 472; see also Smith, 494 U. S., at 878, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 108 L. Ed. 2d 876. A government policy will fail the general applicability requirement if it 1 A plaintiff may also prove a free exercise violation by showing that "official expressions of hostility" to religion accompany laws or policies burdening religious exercise; in cases like that we have "set aside" such policies without further inquiry. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm'n, 584 U. S. ___, ___, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 201 L. Ed. 2d 35 (2018) (slip op., at 18). To resolve today's case, however, we have no need to consult that test. Likewise, while the test we do apply today has been the subject of some criticism, see, e.g., Fulton v. Philadelphia, 593 U. S. ___, ___, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 210 L. Ed. 2d 137 (2021) (slip op., at 5), we have no need to engage with that debate today because no party has asked us to do so. 2022 U.S. LEXIS 3218, *25 Page 9 of 32 "prohibits religious conduct while permitting [*28] secular conduct that undermines the government's asserted interests in a similar way," or if it provides "a mechanism for individualized exemptions." Fulton, 593 U. S., at ___, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 210 L. Ed. 2d 137 (slip op., at 6). Failing either the neutrality or general applicability test is sufficient to trigger strict scrutiny. See Lukumi, 508 U. S., at 546, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 124 L. Ed. 2d 472. In this case, the District's challenged policies were neither neutral nor generally applicable. By its own admission, the District sought to restrict Mr. Kennedy's actions at least in part because of their religious character. As it put it in its September 17 letter, the District prohibited "any overt actions on Mr. Kennedy's part, appearing to a reasonable observer to endorse even voluntary, student-initiated prayer." App. 81. The District further explained that it could not allow "an employee, while still on duty, to engage in religious conduct." Id., at 106 (emphasis added). Prohibiting a religious practice was thus the District's unquestioned "object." The District candidly acknowledged as much below, conceding that its policies were "not neutral" toward religion. 991 F. 3d, at 1020. The District's challenged policies also fail the general applicability test. The District's performance evaluation after the 2015 football season [*29] advised against rehiring Mr. Kennedy on the ground that he "failed to supervise studentathletes after games." App. 114. But, in fact, this was a bespoke requirement specifically addressed to Mr. Kennedy's religious exercise. The District permitted other members of the coaching staff to forgo supervising students briefly after the game to do things like visit with friends or take personal phone calls. App. 205; see also Part I-B, supra. Thus, any sort of postgame supervisory requirement was not applied in an evenhanded, across-the-board way. Again recognizing as much, the District conceded before the Ninth Circuit that its challenged directives were not "generally applicable." 991 F. 3d, at 1020. B When it comes to Mr. Kennedy's free speech claim, our precedents remind us that the First Amendment's protections extend to "teachers and students," neither of whom "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U. S. 503, 506, 89 S. Ct. 733, 21 L. Ed. 2d 731 (1969); see also Lane v. Franks, 573 U. S. 228, 231, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 189 L. Ed. 2d 312 (2014). Of course, none of this means the speech rights of public school employees are so boundless that they may deliver any message to anyone anytime they wish. In addition to being private citizens, teachers and coaches are also government employees paid in part [*30] to speak on the government's behalf and convey its intended messages. To account for the complexity associated with the interplay between free speech rights and government employment, this Court's decisions in Pickering v. Board of Ed. of Township High School Dist. 205, Will Cty., 391 U. S. 563, 88 S. Ct. 1731, 20 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1968), Garcetti, 547 U. S. 410, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 164 L. Ed. 2d 689, and related cases suggest proceeding in two steps. The first step involves a threshold inquiry into the nature of the speech at issue. If a public employee speaks "pursuant to [his or her] official duties," this Court has said the Free Speech Clause generally will not shield the individual from an employer's control and discipline because that kind of speech isfor constitutional purposes at leastthe government's own speech. Id., at 421, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 164 L. Ed. 2d 689. At the same time and at the other end of the spectrum, when an employee "speaks as a citizen addressing a matter of public concern," our cases indicate that the First Amendment may be implicated and courts should proceed to a second step. Id., at 423, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 164 L. Ed. 2d 689. At this second step, our cases suggest that courts should attempt to engage in "a delicate balancing of the competing interests surrounding the speech and its consequences." Ibid. Among other things, courts at this second step have sometimes considered whether an employee's speech interests are outweighed by "'the interest of the State, as an employer, [*31] in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.'" Id., at 417, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 164 L. Ed. 2d 689 (quoting Pickering, 391 U. S., at 568, 88 S. Ct. 1731, 20 L. Ed. 2d 811). Both sides ask us to employ at least certain aspects of this Pickering-Garcetti framework to resolve Mr. Kennedy's free speech claim. They share additional common ground too. They agree that Mr. Kennedy's speech implicates a matter of public concern. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 183; Brief for Respondent 44. They also appear to accept, at least for argument's sake, that Mr. Kennedy's speech does not raise questions of academic freedom that may or may not involve "additional" First Amendment "interests" beyond those captured by this framework. Garcetti, 547 U. S., at 425, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 164 L. Ed. 2d 689; see also Keyishian v. Board of Regents of Univ. of State of N. Y., 385 U. S. 589, 603, 87 S. Ct. 675, 17 L. Ed. 2d 629 (1967); Brief for 2022 U.S. LEXIS 3218, *27 Page 10 of 32 Petitioner 26, n. 2. At the first step of the Pickering-Garcetti inquiry, the parties' disagreement thus turns out to center on one question alone: Did Mr. Kennedy offer his prayers in his capacity as a private citizen, or did they amount to government speech attributable to the District? Our cases offer some helpful guidance for resolving this question. In Garcetti, the Court concluded that a prosecutor's internal memorandum to a supervisor was made "pursuant to [his] official duties," and thus ineligible for First Amendment protection. 547 U. S., at 421, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 164 L. Ed. 2d 689. In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on the fact [*32] that the prosecutor's speech "fulfill[ed] a responsibility to advise his supervisor about how best to proceed with a pending case." Ibid. In other words, the prosecutor's memorandum was government speech because it was speech the government "itself ha[d] commissioned or created" and speech the employee was expected to deliver in the course of carrying out his job. Id., at 422, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 164 L. Ed. 2d 689. By contrast, in Lane a public employer sought to terminate an employee after he testified at a criminal trial about matters involving his government employment. 573 U. S., at 233, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 189 L. Ed. 2d 312. The Court held that the employee's speech was protected by the First Amendment. Id., at 231, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 189 L. Ed. 2d 312. In doing so, the Court held that the fact the speech touched on matters related to public employment was not enough to render it government speech. Id., at 239-240, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 189 L. Ed. 2d 312. Instead, the Court explained, the "critical question . . . is whether the speech at issue is itself ordinarily within the scope of an employee's duties." Id., at 240, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 189 L. Ed. 2d 312. It is an inquiry this Court has said should be undertaken "practical[ly]," rather than with a blinkered focus on the terms of some formal and capacious written job description. Garcetti, 547 U. S., at 424, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 164 L. Ed. 2d 689. To proceed otherwise would be to allow public employers to use "excessively broad job descriptions" to subvert the Constitution's [*33] protections. Ibid. Applying these lessons here, it seems clear to us that Mr. Kennedy has demonstrated that his speech was private speech, not government speech. When Mr. Kennedy uttered the three prayers that resulted in his suspension, he was not engaged in speech "ordinarily within the scope" of his duties as a coach. Lane, 573 U. S., at 240, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 189 L. Ed. 2d 312. He did not speak pursuant to government policy. He was not seeking to convey a government-created message. He was not instructing players, discussing strategy, encouraging better on-field performance, or engaged in any other speech the District paid him to produce as a coach. See Part I-B, supra. Simply put: Mr. Kennedy's prayers did not "ow[e their] existence" to Mr. Kennedy's responsibilities as a public employee. Garcetti, 547 U. S., at 421, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 164 L. Ed. 2d 689. The timing and circumstances of Mr. Kennedy's prayers confirm the point. During the postgame period when these prayers occurred, coaches were free to attend briefly to personal matterseverything from checking sports scores on their phones to greeting friends and family in the stands. App. 205; see Part I-B, supra. We find it unlikely that Mr. Kennedy was fulfilling a responsibility imposed by his employment by praying during a period in which the District has acknowledged [*34] that its coaching staff was free to engage in all manner of private speech. That Mr. Kennedy offered his prayers when students were engaged in other activities like singing the school fight song further suggests that those prayers were not delivered as an address to the team, but instead in his capacity as a private citizen. Nor is it dispositive that Mr. Kennedy's prayers took place "within the office" environmenthere, on the field of play. Garcetti, 547 U. S., at 421, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 164 L. Ed. 2d 689. Instead, what matters is whether Mr. Kennedy offered his prayers while acting within the scope of his duties as a coach. And taken together, both the substance of Mr. Kennedy's speech and the circumstances surrounding it point to the conclusion that he did not. In reaching its contrary conclusion, the Ninth Circuit stressed that, as a coach, Mr. Kennedy served as a role model "clothed with the mantle of one who imparts knowledge and wisdom." 991 F. 3d, at 1015. The court emphasized that Mr. Kennedy remained on duty after games. Id., at 1016. Before us, the District presses the same arguments. See Brief for Respondent 24. And no doubt they have a point. Teachers and coaches often serve as vital role models. But this argument commits the error of positing an "excessively broad [*35] job descriptio[n]" by treating everything teachers and coaches say in the workplace as government speech subject to government control. Garcetti, 547 U. S., at 424, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 164 L. Ed. 2d 689. On this understanding, a school could fire a Muslim teacher for wearing a headscarf in the classroom or prohibit a Christian aide from praying quietly over her lunch in the cafeteria. Likewise, this argument ignores the District Court's conclusion (and the District's concession) that Mr. Kennedy's actual job description left time for a private moment after the game to call home, 2022 U.S. LEXIS 3218, *31 Page 11 of 32 check a text, socialize, or engage in any manner of secular activities. Others working for the District were free to engage briefly in personal speech and activity. App. 205; see Part I-B, supra. That Mr. Kennedy chose to use the same time to pray does not transform his speech into government speech. To hold differently would be to treat religious expression as second-class speech and eviscerate this Court's repeated promise that teachers do not "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." Tinker, 393 U. S., at 506, 89 S. Ct. 733, 21 L. Ed. 2d 731. Of course, acknowledging that Mr. Kennedy's prayers represented his own private speech does not end the matter. So far, we have recognized only that Mr. [*36] Kennedy has carried his threshold burden. Under the Pickering-Garcetti framework, a second step remains where the government may seek to prove that its interests as employer outweigh even an employee's private speech on a matter of public concern. See Lane, 573 U. S., at 236, 242, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 189 L. Ed. 2d 312. 2 IV Whether one views the case through the lens of the Free Exercise or Free Speech Clause, at this point the burden shifts to the District. Under the Free Exercise Clause, a government entity normally must satisfy at least "strict scrutiny," showing that its restrictions on the plaintiff 's protected rights serve a compelling interest and are narrowly tailored to that end. See Lukumi, 508 U. S., at 533, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 124 L. Ed. 2d 472; n. 1, supra. A similar standard generally obtains under the Free Speech Clause. See Reed, 576 U. S., at 171, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 192 L. Ed. 2d 236. The District, however, asks us to apply to Mr. Kennedy's claims the more lenient second-step Pickering-Garcetti test, or alternatively intermediate scrutiny. See Brief for Respondent 44-48. Ultimately, however, it does not matter which standard we apply. The District cannot sustain its burden under any of them.3 A As we have seen, the District argues that its suspension of Mr. Kennedy was essential to avoid a violation of the Establishment Clause. Id., at 35-42. On its account, Mr. Kennedy's prayers might have been protected by the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses. But his rights were [*37] in "direct tension" with the competing demands of the Establishment Clause. App. 43. To resolve that clash, the District reasoned, Mr. Kennedy's rights had to "yield." Ibid. The Ninth Circuit pursued this same line of thinking, insisting that the District's interest in avoiding an Establishment Clause violation "'trump[ed]'" Mr. Kennedy's rights to religious exercise and free speech. 991 F. 3d, at 1017; see also id., at 1020-1021. But how could that be? It is true that this Court and others often refer to the "Establishment Clause," the "Free Exercise Clause," and the "Free Speech Clause" as separate units. But the three Clauses appear in the same sentence of the same Amendment: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech." Amdt. 1. A natural reading of that sentence would seem to suggest the Clauses have "complementary" purposes, not warring ones where one Clause is always sure to prevail over the others. See Everson v. Board of Ed. of Ewing, 330 U. S. 1, 13, 15, 67 S. Ct. 504, 91 L. Ed. 711 (1947). The District arrived at a different understanding this way. It began with the premise that the Establishment Clause is offended whenever a "reasonable observer" could conclude that the government has "endorse[d]" religion. App. 81. The District then took the view that a "reasonable observer" could think it "endorsed Kennedy's religious [*38] activity by not stopping the practice." 991 F. 3d, at 1018; see also App. 80-81; Parts I and II, supra. On the District's account, it did not matter whether the Free Exercise Clause protected Mr. Kennedy's prayer. It did not matter if his expression was private speech protected by the Free Speech Clause. It did not matter that the District never actually endorsed Mr. Kennedy's prayer, no one complained that it 2 Because our analysis and the parties' concessions lead to the conclusion that Mr. Kennedy's prayer constituted private speech on a matter of public concern, we do not decide whether the Free Exercise Clause may sometimes demand a different analysis at the first step of the Pickering-Garcetti framework. 3 It seems, too, that it is only here where our disagreement with the dissent begins in earnest. We do not understand our colleagues to contest that Mr. Kennedy has met his burdens under either the Free Exercise or Free Speech Clause, but only to suggest the District has carried its own burden "to establish that its policy prohibiting Kennedy's public prayers was the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling state interest." Post, at 22 (opinion of SOTOMAYOR,J.). 2022 U.S. LEXIS 3218, *35 Page 12 of 32 had, and a strong public reaction only followed after the District sought to ban Mr. Kennedy's prayer. Because a reasonable observer could (mistakenly) infer that by allowing the prayer the District endorsed Mr. Kennedy's message, the District felt it had to act, even if that meant suppressing otherwise protected First Amendment activities. In this way, the District effectively created its own "vise between the Establishment Clause on one side and the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses on the other," placed itself in the middle, and then chose its preferred way out of its self-imposed trap. See Pinette, 515 U. S., at 768 (plurality opinion); Shurtleff v. Boston, 596 U. S. ___, ___-___, 142 S. Ct. 1583, 212 L. Ed. 2d 621 (2022) (GORSUCH, J., concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 4-5). To defend its approach, the District relied on Lemon and its progeny. See App. 43-45. In upholding the District's actions, the Ninth Circuit followed the same course. See Part II-C, supra. And, to be sure, in Lemon this [*39] Court attempted a "grand unified theory" for assessing Establishment Clause claims. American Legion v. American Humanist Assn., 588 U. S. ___, ___, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 204 L. Ed. 2d 452 (2019) (plurality opinion) (slip op., at 24). That approach called for an examination of a law's purposes, effects, and potential for entanglement with religion. Lemon, 403 U. S., at 612-613. In time, the approach also came to involve estimations about whether a "reasonable observer" would consider the government's challenged action an "endorsement" of religion. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U. S. 573, 593, 109 S. Ct. 3086, 106 L. Ed. 2d 472 (1989); id., at 630 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); Shurtleff, 596 U. S., at ___, 142 S. Ct. 1583, 212 L. Ed. 2d 621 (opinion of GORSUCH, J.) (slip op., at 3). What the District and the Ninth Circuit overlooked, however, is that the "shortcomings" associated with this "ambitiou[s]," abstract, and ahistorical approach to the Establishment Clause became so "apparent" that this Court long ago abandoned Lemon and its endorsement test offshoot. American Legion, 588 U. S., at ___-___, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 204 L. Ed. 2d 452 (plurality opinion) (slip op., at 12-13); see also Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U. S. 565, 575-577, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 188 L. Ed. 2d 835 (2014). The Court has explained that these tests "invited chaos" in lower courts, led to "differing results" in materially identical cases, and created a "minefield" for legislators. Pinette, 515 U. S., at 768-769, n. 3 (plurality opinion) (emphasis deleted). This Court has since made plain, too, that the Establishment Clause does not include anything like a "modified heckler's veto, in which . . . religious activity can be proscribed" [*40] based on "'perceptions'" or "'discomfort.'" Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U. S. 98, 119, 121 S. Ct. 2093, 150 L. Ed. 2d 151 (2001) (emphasis deleted). An Establishment Clause violation does not automatically follow whenever a public school or other government entity "fail[s] to censor" private religious speech. Board of Ed. of Westside Community Schools (Dist. 66) v. Mergens, 496 U. S. 226, 250, 110 S. Ct. 2356, 110 L. Ed. 2d 191 (1990) (plurality opinion). Nor does the Clause "compel the government to purge from the public sphere" anything an objective observer could reasonably infer endorses or "partakes of the religious." Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U. S. 677, 699, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 162 L. Ed. 2d 607 (2005) (BREYER, J., concurring in judgment). In fact, just this Term the Court unanimously rejected a city's attempt to censor religious speech based on Lemon and the endorsement test. See Shurtleff, 596 U. S., at ___-___, 142 S. Ct. 1583, 212 L. Ed. 2d 621 (slip op., at 1-2); id., at ___ (ALITO, J., concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 1); id., at ___, ___-___ (opinion of GORSUCH, J.) (slip op., at 1, 4-5).4 4 Nor was that decision an outlier. In the last two decades, this Court has often criticized or ignored Lemon and its endorsement test variation. See, e.g., Espinoza v. Montana Dept. of Revenue, 591 U. S. ___, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 207 L. Ed. 2d 679 (2020); American Legion v. American Humanist Assn., 588 U. S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 204 L. Ed. 2d 452 (2019); Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U. S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 201 L. Ed. 2d 775 (2018); Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 582 U. S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 198 L. Ed. 2d 551 (2017); Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U. S. 565, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 188 L. Ed. 2d 835 (2014); Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, 565 U. S. 171, 132 S. Ct. 694, 181 L. Ed. 2d 650 (2012); Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn, 563 U. S. 125, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 179 L. Ed. 2d 523 (2011); Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc., 551 U. S. 587, 127 S. Ct. 2553, 168 L. Ed. 2d 424 (2007); id., at 618, 127 S. Ct. 2553, 168 L. Ed. 2d 424 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U. S. 677, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 162 L. Ed. 2d 607 (2005); id., at 689 (BREYER, J., concurring in judgment). A vast number of Justices have criticized those tests over an even longer period. See Shurtleff v. Boston, 596 U. S. ___, at ___-___, and nn. 9-10, 142 S. Ct. 1583, 212 L. Ed. 2d 621 (2022) (GORSUCH, J., concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 7-8, and nn. 9-10) (collecting opinions authored or joined by ROBERTS and Rehnquist, C. J., and THOMAS, BREYER, ALITO, KAVANAUGH, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, JJ.). The point has not been lost on our lower court colleagues. See, e.g., 4 F. 4th 910, 939-941 (2021) (O'Scannlain, J., respecting denial of rehearing en banc); id., at 945 (R. Nelson, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); id., at 947, n. 3 (collecting lower court cases from "around the country" that "have recognized Lemon's demise"). 2022 U.S. LEXIS 3218, *38 Page 13 of 32 In place of Lemon and the endorsement test, this Court has instructed that the Establishment Clause must be interpreted by "'reference to historical practices and understandings.'" Town of Greece, 572 U. S., at 576, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 188 L. Ed. 2d 835; see also American Legion, 588 U. S., at ___, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 204 L. Ed. 2d 452 (plurality opinion) (slip op., at 25). "'[T]he line'" that courts and governments "must draw between the permissible and the impermissible" has to "'accor[d ] with history and faithfully reflec[t ] the understanding of the Founding Fathers.'" [*41] Town of Greece, 572 U. S., at 577, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 188 L. Ed. 2d 835 (quoting School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203, 294, 83 S. Ct. 1560, 10 L. Ed. 2d 844 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring)). An analysis focused on original meaning and history, this Court has stressed, has long represented the rule rather than some "'exception'" within the "Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence." 572 U. S., at 575, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 188 L. Ed. 2d 835; see American Legion, 588 U. S., at ___, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 204 L. Ed. 2d 452 (plurality opinion) (slip op., at 25); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U. S. 488, 490, 81 S. Ct. 1680, 6 L. Ed. 2d 982 (1961) (analyzing certain historical elements of religious establishments); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 437-440, 81 S. Ct. 1101, 6 L. Ed. 2d 393 (1961) (analyzing Sunday closing laws by looking to their "place . . . in the First Amendment's history"); Walz v. Tax Comm'n of City of New York, 397 U. S. 664, 680, 90 S. Ct. 1409, 25 L. Ed. 2d 697 (1970) (analyzing the "history and uninterrupted practice" of church tax exemptions). The District and the Ninth Circuit erred by failing to heed this guidance. B Perhaps sensing that the primary theory it pursued below rests on a mistaken understanding of the Establishment Clause, the District offers a backup argument in this Court. It still contends that its Establishment Clause concerns trump Mr. Kennedy's free exercise and free speech rights. But the District now seeks to supply different reasoning for that result. Now, it says, it was justified in suppressing Mr. Kennedy's religious activity because otherwise it would have been guilty of coercing students to pray. See Brief for Respondent 34-37. And, the District says, coercing worship amounts to an Establishment Clause violation on anyone's account of the Clause's original meaning. As it [*42] turns out, however, there is a pretty obvious reason why the Ninth Circuit did not adopt this theory in proceedings below: The evidence cannot sustain it. To be sure, this Court has long held that government may not, consistent with a historically sensitive understanding of the Establishment Clause, "make a religious observance compulsory." Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 306, 314, 72 S. Ct. 679, 96 L. Ed. 954 (1952). Government "may not coerce anyone to attend church," ibid., nor may it force citizens to engage in "a formal religious exercise," Lee v. Weisman, 505 U. S. 577, 589, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 120 L. Ed. 2d 467 (1992). No doubt, too, coercion along these lines was among the foremost hallmarks of religious establishments the framers sought to prohibit when they adopted the First Amendment. 5 Members of this Court have sometimes disagreed on what exactly qualifies as impermissible coercion in light of the original meaning of the Establishment Clause. Compare Lee, 505 U. S., at 593, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 120 L. Ed. 2d 467, with id., at 640-641, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 120 L. Ed. 2d 4