What areas of law are pertinent to this article? Describe what the identified areas of law cover, and explain how they are relevant to the issues raised in the article. 
Case overview Commonwealth Financial Planning Limited (CFPL), the financial planning arm of Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CBA), was involved in a huge fraud scheme from 2003 to 2012. Rogue financial planners at CFPL manipulated their clients' files and forged documents to invest their clients' monies in extremely high-risk investments, with the aim of earning higher commissions and bonuses. Such fraudulent financial advice caused hundreds of Australians to lose their life savings, some running into millions. Despite tipoffs by whistleblowers within CFPL, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) was criticised for being inexplicably slow and inadequate in its response. Meanwhile, CFPL's efforts to compensate the victims were also lambasted as covering up for their rogue planners while trying to bully their victims into settling for minimal compensation. The objective of this case is to allow a discussion of issues such as the impact of "pay for performance" on behaviour, governance in company groups; management's and directors' roles in ensuring compliance; role of regulators and the media in corporate governance; whistleblower protection; and ethics. One of the 38 names highlighted in the warning notice, Donald (Don) Nguyen, was hauntingly familiar to Morris. Don was a fellow financial planner who sat just a couple of feet away from Morris at the Chatswood Branch. He was one of the top writers of CFPL, amassing 1,300 clients who had invested their money with him. In 2007, Don was top on CFPL's Financial Planners league table, managing portfolios worth A$39,064,657 for the bank that year alone, grossly exceeding his annual target by more than three-fold. But Don's ascent to the peak was a tad dubious. Better known by his colleagues as "Dodgy Don", he had a sinister reputation of notching sales through unscrupulous means. After personally witnessing some of Don's dishonest acts, an outraged Morris alerted his team's Financial Planning Manager. To his disbelief, the manager brushed the issue aside. Morris' colleagues later explained that Don held the aegis of management protection due to his status as a top writer in CBA. More than half of a CBA financial planner's total annual remuneration depended on short-term incentives such as bonuses. Commissions were pegged to the risk levels of investment assets sold, hence financial planners had an incentive to encourage their clients to opt for as risky an investment portfolio as possible. Furthermore, the tone at the top was unforgiving - meet your sales targets, or surrender your rice bowl'. Such was the "boiler-room" culture CBA had nurtured through an aggressive sales-driven and excessively short-term remuneration incentive scheme - one driven by a myopic chase of bonuses with little place for honesty. ASIC's investigation confirmed the frauds of Don and other financial planners in CFPL. On 26 October 2011, CBA entered into an Enforceable Undertaking (EU) with ASIC for two years. At the same time, Braund's patience was running out with the inadequate responses to her complaints at CBA and ASIC. Despite Braund being granted interviews with ASIC to tell her story, she was adamant that not enough was being done to appease the anger and anguish of the victims. Her repeated complaints to CBA and ASIC had generally fallen on deaf ears, and she was disgusted at CBA's ostensible attempts to cover up. She finally decided to take her story to Fairfax Media. The Fairfax reports triggered a Senate Inquiry the following month, on 20 June 2013, centering on two key issues - the misconduct of financial advisers in CFPL and ASIC's general poor performance. The final report of the Senate Inquiry was released on 26 June 2014. It contained scathing criticisms of both ASIC and CFPL. There was forgery and dishonest concealment of material facts," as reported in the inquiry34. Committee chairman Senator Mark Bishop said CFPL's actions were "facilitated by a reckless, sales-based culture and a negligent management, who ignored or disregarded non-compliance and unlawful activity as long as profits were being made". He also commented that "ASIC appears to miss or ignore clear and persistent early warning signs of corporate wrongdoing, or troubling trends that place the interest of consumers or investors at great risk"26. Among a whole host of findings with regard to ASIC and CFPL, one was to demand for a royal commission into the saga, though it was eventually rejected. Case overview Commonwealth Financial Planning Limited (CFPL), the financial planning arm of Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CBA), was involved in a huge fraud scheme from 2003 to 2012. Rogue financial planners at CFPL manipulated their clients' files and forged documents to invest their clients' monies in extremely high-risk investments, with the aim of earning higher commissions and bonuses. Such fraudulent financial advice caused hundreds of Australians to lose their life savings, some running into millions. Despite tipoffs by whistleblowers within CFPL, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) was criticised for being inexplicably slow and inadequate in its response. Meanwhile, CFPL's efforts to compensate the victims were also lambasted as covering up for their rogue planners while trying to bully their victims into settling for minimal compensation. The objective of this case is to allow a discussion of issues such as the impact of "pay for performance" on behaviour, governance in company groups; management's and directors' roles in ensuring compliance; role of regulators and the media in corporate governance; whistleblower protection; and ethics. One of the 38 names highlighted in the warning notice, Donald (Don) Nguyen, was hauntingly familiar to Morris. Don was a fellow financial planner who sat just a couple of feet away from Morris at the Chatswood Branch. He was one of the top writers of CFPL, amassing 1,300 clients who had invested their money with him. In 2007, Don was top on CFPL's Financial Planners league table, managing portfolios worth A$39,064,657 for the bank that year alone, grossly exceeding his annual target by more than three-fold. But Don's ascent to the peak was a tad dubious. Better known by his colleagues as "Dodgy Don", he had a sinister reputation of notching sales through unscrupulous means. After personally witnessing some of Don's dishonest acts, an outraged Morris alerted his team's Financial Planning Manager. To his disbelief, the manager brushed the issue aside. Morris' colleagues later explained that Don held the aegis of management protection due to his status as a top writer in CBA. More than half of a CBA financial planner's total annual remuneration depended on short-term incentives such as bonuses. Commissions were pegged to the risk levels of investment assets sold, hence financial planners had an incentive to encourage their clients to opt for as risky an investment portfolio as possible. Furthermore, the tone at the top was unforgiving - meet your sales targets, or surrender your rice bowl'. Such was the "boiler-room" culture CBA had nurtured through an aggressive sales-driven and excessively short-term remuneration incentive scheme - one driven by a myopic chase of bonuses with little place for honesty. ASIC's investigation confirmed the frauds of Don and other financial planners in CFPL. On 26 October 2011, CBA entered into an Enforceable Undertaking (EU) with ASIC for two years. At the same time, Braund's patience was running out with the inadequate responses to her complaints at CBA and ASIC. Despite Braund being granted interviews with ASIC to tell her story, she was adamant that not enough was being done to appease the anger and anguish of the victims. Her repeated complaints to CBA and ASIC had generally fallen on deaf ears, and she was disgusted at CBA's ostensible attempts to cover up. She finally decided to take her story to Fairfax Media. The Fairfax reports triggered a Senate Inquiry the following month, on 20 June 2013, centering on two key issues - the misconduct of financial advisers in CFPL and ASIC's general poor performance. The final report of the Senate Inquiry was released on 26 June 2014. It contained scathing criticisms of both ASIC and CFPL. There was forgery and dishonest concealment of material facts," as reported in the inquiry34. Committee chairman Senator Mark Bishop said CFPL's actions were "facilitated by a reckless, sales-based culture and a negligent management, who ignored or disregarded non-compliance and unlawful activity as long as profits were being made". He also commented that "ASIC appears to miss or ignore clear and persistent early warning signs of corporate wrongdoing, or troubling trends that place the interest of consumers or investors at great risk"26. Among a whole host of findings with regard to ASIC and CFPL, one was to demand for a royal commission into the saga, though it was eventually rejected
