Whether dealing with monkeys, rats, or human beings, it is hardly controversial to state that most organisms seek information concerning what activities are rewarded, and then seek to do (or at least pretend to do) those things, often to the virtual exclusion of activities not rewarded. The extent to which this occurs of course will depend on the perceived attractiveness of the rewards offered, but neither operant nor expectancy theorists would quarrel with the essence of this notion. Nevertheless, numerous examples exist of reward systems that are fouled up in that the types of behavior rewarded are those which the rewarder is trying to discourage, while the behavior desired is not being rewarded at all. Fouled Up Systems In Politics Official goals are "purposely vague and general and do not indicate . . . the host of decisions that must be made among alternative ways of achieving official goals and the priority of multiple goals . . . "^ They usually may be relied on to offend absolutely no one, and in this sense can be considered high acceptance, low quality goals. An example might be "All Americans are entitled to health care." Operative goals are higher in quality but lower in acceptance, since they specify where the money will come from, and what alternative goals will be ignored. The American citizenry supposedly wants its candidates for public office to set forth operative goals, making their proposed programs clear, and specifying sources and uses of funds. However, since operative goals are lower in acceptance, and since aspirants to public office need acceptance (from at least 50.1 percent of the people), most politicians prefer to speak only of official goals, at least until after the election. They of course would agree to speak at the operative level if "punished" for not doing so. The electorate could do this by refusing to support candidates who do not speak at the operative level. Instead, however, the American voter typically punishes (withholds support from) candidates who frankly discuss where the money will come from, rewards Academy of Management Executive politicians who speak only of official goals, but hopes that candidates (despite the reward system) will discuss the issues operatively. /n War If some oversimplification may be permitted, let it be assumed that the primary goal of the organization (Pentagon, Luftwaffe, or whatever) is to win. Let it be assumed further that the primary goal of most individuals on the front lines is to get home alive. Then there appears to be an important conflict in goalspersonally rational behavior by those at the bottom will endanger goal attainment by those at the top. But not necessarily! It depends on how the reward system is set up. The Vietnam war was indeed a study of disobedience and rebellion, with terms such as "fragging" (killing one's own commanding officer) and "search and evade" becoming part of the military vocabulary. The difference in subordinates' acceptance of authority between World War II and Vietnam is reported to be considerable, and veterans of the Second World War were often quoted as being outraged at the mutinous actions of many American soldiers in Vietnam. Consider, however, some critical differences in the reward system in use during the two conflicts. What did the GI in World War II want? To go home. And when did he get to go home? When the war was won! If he disobeyed the orders to clean out the trenches and take the hills, the war would not be won and he would not go home. Furthermore, what were his chances of attaining his goal (getting home alive) if he obeyed the orders compared to his chances if he did not? What is being suggested is that the rational soldier in World War II, whether patriotic or not, probably found it expedient to obey. Consider the reward system in use in Vietnam. What did the soldier at the bottom want? To go home. And when did he get to go home? When his tour of duty was over! This was the case whether or not the war was won. Furthermore, concerning the relative chance of getting home alive by obeying orders compared to the chance if they were disobeyed, it is worth noting that a mutineer in Vietnam was far more likely to be assigned rest and rehabilitation (on the assumption that fatigue was the cause) than he was to suffer any negative consequence. In his description of the "zone of indifference," Barnard stated that "a person can and will accept a communication as authoritative only when .. . at the time of his decision, he believes it to be compatible with his personal interests as a whole."^ In light of the reward system used in Vietnam, wouldn't it have been personally irrational for some orders to have been obeyed? Was not the military implementing a system which rewarded disobedience, while hoping that soldiers (despite the reward system) would obey orders? In Medicine Theoretically, physicians can make either of two types of error, and intuitively one seems as bad as the other. Doctors can pronounce patients sick when they are actually well (a type 1 error), thus causing them needless anxiety and expense, curtailment of enjoyable foods and activities, and even physical danger by subjecting them to needless medication and surgery. Alternately, a doctor can label a sick person well (a type 2 error), and thus avoid treating what may be a serious, even fatal ailment. It might be natural to conclude that physicians seek to minimize both types of error. Ker r Suc h a conclusio n woul d b e wrong . It ha s bee n estimate d tha t numerou s American s hav e bee n afflicte d with iatrogeni c (physicia n caused) illnesses. * Thi s occur s whe n th e docto r i s approache d b y someon e complainin g of a few stra y symptoms . Th e docto r classifie s an d organize s thes e symptoms , give s the m a name , an d obligingl y tell s th e patien t wha t furthe r symptom s may b e expected . Thi s informatio n often act s a s a self-fulfillin g prophecy , with th e resul t tha t from tha t da y o n th e patien t for al l practica l purpose s i s sick . Why doe s thi s happen ? Why ar e physician s s o reluctan t t o sustai n a typ e 2 erro r (pronouncin g a sic k perso n well ) tha t the y wil l tolerat e many typ e 1 errors ? Again , a look a t th e rewar d syste m i s needed . Th e punishment s for a typ e 2 erro r ar e real : guilt , embarrassment , an d th e threa t of a malpractic e suit . O n th e othe r hand , a typ e 1 erro r (labelin g a wel l perso n sick) i s a muc h safe r an d conservativ e approac h t o medicin e in today' s litigiou s society . Typ e 1 error s als o ar e likel y t o generat e increase d incom e an d a strea m of stead y customer s who , bein g wel l i n a limite d physiologica l sense , wil l no t embarras s th e docto r b y dyin g abruptly . Fello w physician s an d th e genera l publi c therefor e ar e reall y rewardin g typ e 1 error s whil e hopin g ferventl y tha t doctor s wil l try no t t o mak e them . A curren t exampl e of rewardin g typ e 1 error s i s provide d b y Browar d County , Florida , wher e a n elderl y or disable d perso n facin g a competenc y hearin g i s evaluate d b y thre e court-appointe d expert s wh o ge t pai d muc h mor e for fhe same examination if th e perso n i s rule d t o b e incompetent . Fo r example , psychiatrist s ar e pai d $32 5 if the y judg e someon e t o b e incapacitated , bu t ear n only $12 5 if th e perso n i s judge d competent . Court-appointe d attorney s i n Broward als o ear n more$32 5 a s oppose d t o $175if thei r client s los e tha n if the y win . Are you surprise d t o lear n that , of 59 8 incapacit y proceeding s initiate d an d complete d i n th e county i n 1993 , 570 ende d with a verdic t of incapacitation? ^ In Universities Society hope s tha t professor s wil l no t neglec t thei r teachin g responsibilitie s but rewards the m almos t entirel y for researc h an d publications . Thi s i s mos t tru e a t th e larg e an d prestigiou s universities . Cliche s suc h a s "goo d researc h an d goo d teachin g g o together " notwithstanding , professor s often fin d tha t the y mus t choos e betwee n teachin g an d research-oriente d activitie s whe n allocatin g thei r time . Reward s for goo d teachin g ar e usuall y limite d t o outstandin g teache r awards , whic h ar e give n t o only a smal l percentag e of goo d teacher s an d usuall y besto w littl e mone y an d fleetin g prestige . Punishment s for poo r teachin g ar e als o rare . Reward s for researc h an d publications , o n th e othe r hand , an d punishment s for failur e t o accomplis h these , ar e common . Furthermore , publication-oriente d r6sum6 s usuall y wil l b e well-receive d a t othe r universities , wherea s teachin g credentials , harde r t o document an d quantify , ar e muc h les s transferable . Consequentl y it i s rationa l for university professor s t o concentrat e o n research , eve n t o th e detrimen t of teachin g an d a t th e expens e of thei r students . By th e sam e token , it i s rationa l for student s t o ac t base d upo n th e goa l displacement ^ whic h ha s occurre d withi n universitie s concernin g wha t the y ar e rewarde d for . If it i s assume d tha t a primary goa l of a universit y i s t o transfe r knowledg e from teache r t o student , the n grade s becom e identifiabl e a s a mean s towar d tha t goal , servin g a s motivational , control , an d feedbac k device s t o expedit e th e knowledg e transfer . Instead , however , th e grade s themselve s hav e becom e muc h mor e importan t for entranc e t o graduat e school , successfu l

Think of a time when your organization (or an organization you worked for in the past) rewarded A while hoping for B, as described in the Folly article. Describe the situation, using at least two course concepts. Remember to use bold to highlight course concepts. and write in ur words , no plaigraism

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