Whether or not the farmers in this case are "merchants" as a matter of law, which is not before us$,$

the evidence does not demand a conclusion that they are outside of that category which is excepted

from the requirement of a signed writing to bind a buyer and seller of goods....To allow a farmer who

deals in crops of the kind at issue, or who otherwise comes within the definition of "merchant" in

$[$UCC$]2-104(1),$ to renege on a confirmed oral booking for the sale of crops, would result in a fraud

on the buyer. The farmer could abide by the booking if the price thereafter declined but reject it if the

price rose; the buyer, on the other hand, would be forced to sell the crop following the booking at its

peril, or wait until the farmer decides whether to honor the booking or not.

Defendants' narrow construction of "merchant" would, given the booking procedure used for the sale

of farm products, thus guarantee to the farmers the best of both possible worlds $($fulfill booking if

price goes down after booking and reject it if price improves$)$ and to the buyers the worst of both

possible worlds. On the other hand, construing "merchants" in $[$UCC$]2-104(1)$ as not excluding as a

matter of law farmers such as the ones in this case, protects them equally as well as the buyer. If the

market price declines after the booking, they are assured of the higher booking price; the buyer

cannot renege, as $[$UCC$]2-201(2)$ would apply.

In giving this construction to the statute, we are persuaded by $[$Citation$],$ supra, and the analyses

provided in the following cases from other states: $[$Citations$].$ By the same token, we reject the

narrow construction given in other states' cases: $[$Citations$].$ We believe this is the proper

construction to give the two statutes, $[$UCC $2-104(1)$ and $2-201(2)],$ as taken together they are thus

further branches stemming from the centuries$-$old simple legal idea pacta servanda sunt$-$

agreements are to be kept. So construed, they evince the legislative intent to enforce the accepted

practices of the marketplace among those who frequent it$.$

Judgment reversed. $[$Four justices concurred with Justice Beasley$].$

Benham, J$.,$ dissenting.

Because I cannot agree with the majority's conclusion that appellees are merchants, I must

respectfully dissent.