Why holdout behavior cannot be fully prevented under the single-limb voting mechanism in some countries (Table 2)

0- 0.4 0.4- 0.8 0.8- 1.2 1.2- 1.6 1.6- 2.0 2.0- 2.4 Table 2: Minimum Bond Purchase for Holdouts In Low Income Countries (billion $) Number of Low Income Countries 13 1 1 2 1 2 0- 0.4 0.4- 0.8 0.8- 1.2 1.2- 1.6 1.6- 2.0 2.0- 2.4 Table 2: Minimum Bond Purchase for Holdouts In Low Income Countries (billion $) Number of Low Income Countries 13 1 1 2 1 2