Write a report where you link up each of the factors to the case study of Real Wire found in question 1. You should state how, in your own opinion, you expect each of these factors to affect Real Wires audit. The scenario is below

Real-Wire is a public electronic funds transfer network with its head office and major computer switch based in Chicago. It is currently under contract to the Department of Treasury to assist in E-Commerce and Electronic Funds Transfer (EFT) initiatives when federal systems are overloaded. They have handled overload processing, which has increased their workload by 15- 20 percent on occasions. The company has computer switches in each capital city throughout the United States, including Alaska and Hawaii, that are linked into a national communications network. Approximately 200 financial institutions (banks, building societies, credit unions) use the network to provide Automatic Teller Machine and Point-Of-Sale services to their customers. Real-Wire has only been in operation for 20+ years, but during that time it has been very successful. When the United States began to deregulate its financial markets in 1985 and foreign banks began to enter the marketplace, Real-Wire obtained substantial new business because it could offer these financial institutions immediate EFT services. As a consultant specializing in information systems control and audit, you have been hired by the managing director of Real-Wire to examine the state of controls within the EFT system. She explains to you that an increasing number of potential customers are requesting some type of independent assurance that controls within the system are reliable. Accordingly, she has decided to initiate a controls review of the entire system so that a third-party letter of comfort can be provided to potential customers. The initial part of your controls review focuses on the main switch in Chicago. As part of your review, you examine the status of disaster recovery planning for the switch. In terms of short-term recovery, controls appear to be in place and working. Backup tapes for all data and programs are stored both on-site and off-site to enable recovery if programs or data are lost for some reason. In addition, protocols for short-term recovery are well-documented, and operators seem familiar with and well-trained in these protocols. From time to time they haveto exercise these protocols because some temporary system failure occurs. Real-Wire claims to offer its customers 24-hour service. The director states its personnel recognize the criticality of being able to perform efficient, effective system recovery in a timely manner. When you examine controls over long-term disaster recovery, however, the situation is different. There is no long-term disaster recovery plan, nor are operators and other personnel trained in recovery protocols for a major disaster. For example, it is uncertain how Real-Wire would recover from a fire that destroyed the switch or an event that caused major structural damage to the switch. As a result of your findings, you meet with the managing director to find out why controls in this area are so weak when controls in other areas seem strong. She is surprised by your concern for long-term disaster recovery. She argues that for three reasons it is not costeffective to prepare a long-term disaster recovery plan and to practice recovery protocols on a regular basis: First, she believes a plan is useless because, in the event of a major disaster, timely recovery is impossible anyway. She points out that it would take several days for the telephone company to reconfigure all the data communication lines to another site. Even if Real-Wire had another switch available immediately, it would not operate during this period. Second, she argues that Real-Wires customers would not tolerate a decrease in their service levels when disaster recovery exercises were carried out. Unless disaster recovery protocols are practiced regularly, she argues, they are useless. Third, she contends that eventual recovery will not be a problem anyway. Operations can simply be transferred to one of the switch in one of the capital cities. While the telephone company reconfigures data communication lines to the other switch, backup files can be flown to the site with plenty of time to spare. She argues that the customers of Real-Wire recognize that they will not be able to use their EFT facilities during the recovery period, but they accept this situation as a risk of doing business. The only other alternative, she argues, is to replicate all switching facilities in each capital city, and this clearly is not cost-effective