You are in charge of sales for a symphony that has a mini-season of two concerts, one featuring music by Wagner and the other featuring new music by John Harbison. Some in the potential audience like old music much more than contemporary, others like both equally, and others like contemporary much more than old music. You must decide how to price the individual tickets and the series in order to maximize profit. We make some simplifying assumptions: The symphony has a very large concert hall relative to its popularity and hence capacity constraints are not an issue; all seats are equally desirable; and the marginal cost of each concertgoer is zero. Hence, the symphony's goal is to maximize revenue. Assume the market is highly segmented, with only three types of customers. There is one customer of each type (which is equivalent to assuming there are equal numbers of each type). The valuations of these customers for each of the two concerts are as follows:

Customer Wagner Harbison

A 50 5

B 40 40

C 5 50

A customer may go to one or both of the concerts. A customer's valuation of a bundle equals the sum of his valuations of the concerts in the bundle.

Suppose that you can perfectly price discriminate. Then type a pays $ _______for Wagner and $_______ for Harbison.