You are the Refinery Emergency Response Coordinator for an incident at the SJV Refinery which hasbeen in operation since 1966. The refinery processes 120,000 bbl of crude oil per day, which has a sulfurcontent of 2.5 percent. The refinery converts crude oil to naphtha, lift oil, and heavy oils using theAtmospheric/ Vacuum Distillation Unit with crucial equipment such as the following: naphtha, kerosene, gasoline, and diesel hydrotreaters; isomerization unit; naphtha reformer; fluid catalytic cracker; coker; hydrocracker; polymerization unit (petrochemical section of the refinery polymerizing olefin gases to producepolyethylene); sulfur recovery Claus plant (catalytic reactors); and distillate/gasoline blending tanks.The refinery was initiating work on a major plant turnaround at the time of the incident to completerequired maintenance repairs, mechanical integrity inspections, and modifications to existingequipment. Twenty contractor companies (approximately 150 employees) have been contracted toperform this work under the direction of refinery staff. All of the contractor workers completed therefinery orientation training.Work for the contractor crews is assigned/scheduled each morning. On the day of the incident, the dayshift (6 am to 6 pm) crew has been tasked with isolating the acid gas feed stream for the Claus unit. Dueto other work priorities, the crew did not isolate the line as planned. A shift turnover for the nightcontractor crew did not happen due to mandatory safety training that delayed their arrival at theworksite. Upon their arrival at the worksite, the night crew held a job safety analysis (JSA) review of thescheduled task (line breaking of the acid gas feed line to replace a segment) to be performed and thehazard present. No pressure gauges or monitoring was present to indicate that the acid gas feed linewas operational. The crew initiated the line-breaking activity (open the line to the atmosphere) atapproximately 7:45 pm under self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA), which almost immediatelyresulted in the uncontrolled release of acid gas. A nearby ignition source from a welding operationignited the flammable gas. The following actions were initially taken:

The evacuation alarm was sounded, and the refinery emergency response team (ERT) wasactivated. The plant manager and the local fire department were notified of the incident. The incident command was established at the refinery office near the main refinery access gateto the south (this is the furthest distance within the refinery boundary from the incidentlocation). The refinery ERT Incident Commander implemented actions required under the approvedrefinery emergency response plan. The ERT was not able to immediately isolate the acid gas feed line. The fire department arrived on location and assumed the incident command of the event.Additional Relevant Information: The refinery encompasses an area measuring 2000 feet by 1400 feet. The Claus unit is located inthe most northern part of the refinery, approximately 1350 feet from the main refinery accessgate to the south. The polymerization unit is operating directly adjacent to the Claus unit. The nearest residential community is located approximately 1000 feet to the northeast of therefinery. A plastic recycling plant is located along the south fence boundary of the refinery. A major interstate highway runs directly parallel to the plant, approximately 1

identify at least three regulations that cover the SVJ Refinery incident.

Gather at the conference table and share with your safety team, about what you have found.