Your and your partner are working together on a project. Where your effort towards the project is y and your partner's effort is p, the project's value will equal afy + p) + yp. You will share this value equally {each of you getting halt of it) once the project is complete. For both you and your partner, effort is costly: 3; units of effort bears a cost of y2 for you, and similarly 19 units of effort comes with a cost of p2 for your partner. Therefore your payoff is 0-5[a(y + p) + yp] * y2 and your partner's i5 0.5[a(y + p] + yp] * p2. Continue to consider the sequential version of the game described at the start ofthis problem, with a 2 4 and with the only effort levels available to you and your partner being 0, 1 and 2. You choose your effort level first. Your partner observes your effort level, then chooses theirs. Select all of the options that accurately describe a pure strategy su bgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this game. You will only earn the points for this question if you select all the correct answers, and only the correct answers. Note: it is acceptable to use the shorthand (Your strategy; your partner's strategy). C] a. Both choose 2 C] b. (2.2} C] c. (2.222) C] d. (2.112) C] e. (1112) E] f. (2.111 or112)