Zelnick v. Adams 606 S.E 2d 843 (Va. 2005)

MUST BE EXAMPLES FROM CASE

case brief format :

1. FACTS
2. JUDGMENT
3. LEGAL PRINCIPLE

A ISSUE (question of law)

B HOLDING

Yes/ No

1. REASONING

A GENERAL ANALYSIS

B APPLIED ANALYSIS

In response, Zelnick contended the Florida court's paternity order was not determinative of Jonathan's status under the trusts. Moreover, Zelnick directed the trial court's attention to the fact that Mr. Hylton's will placed the decision as to Jonathan's status as issue for purposes of trust distributions within the purview of the trustees. Adams also communicated to Zelnick that she feared payments were being made to some of Mr. Hylton's grandchildren through the trusts. The trial court found that Zelnick's legal services were "in fact necessary" because Jonathan's status as issue of Mr. Hylton for purposes of trust distributions would not have been resolved without legal proceedings to compel a resolution. Our inquiry, therefore, goes only to the final question of whether Zelnick's legal services were "actually necessary" to Jonathan's "position and condition." As we indicated in Zelnick I, the answer to this inquiry "must be determined by consideration of the circumstances at the time of rendering the services or providing the things in issue." Zelnick I, 263 Va. at 611, 561 S.E.2d at 717. The record amply supports the trial court's determination. Zelnick filed suit on Jonathan's behalf on May 15, 1997, when Jonathan was less than a year from attaining status as an adult. The consent decree establishing Jonathan as Mr. Hylton's grandchild and issue was entered on January 23, 1998, less than three months before Jonathan's eighteenth birthday. Before Zelnick executed the retainer agreement, he obtained a copy of Mr. Hylton's probated will and reviewed the trust accountings. Zelnick knew that the distribution dates for the grandchildren's trusts would be in 2014 and 2021. Zelnick testified that he "read the will over many times" in order to "make sure [he] had a full understanding of the terms and conditions and how the will would work." Even though any interest Jonathan might have had in the trusts would not be realized for at least 17 years, Zelnick began writing to the trustees, asking them to acknowledge Jonathan as Mr. Hylton's grandson and issue for the purposes of trust distributions. However, trustees' counsel did confirm by letter of December 13, 1996, that the triggering events for any distributions from Mr. Hylton's trust were "many years in the future." Trustees' counsel also informed Zelnick that the trustees had been advised to "carefully evaluate the merits of [Jonathan's] claim" "as soon as any amount is to be paid to Mr. Hylton's grandchildren. . . " Trustees' counsel also confirmed distributions of the trusts would be made in 2014 and 2021 respectively. On February 19, 1997, trustees' counsel again replied to Zelnick indicating that the trust was "still in the process of conducting a due diligence analysis of [Jonathan's] claim." Nonetheless, Zelnick filed suit on Jonathan's behalf on May 15, 1997, 11 months before Jonathan became an adult. By consideration of the circumstances at the time of rendering the services," Zelnick 1, 263 Va. at 611, 561 S.E.2d at 717, we agree with the trial court's judgment that delaying the suit until Jonathan became 18 "would not have compromised Jonathan's position." The record does not reflect any advantage to the legal proceedings before Jonathan turned 18 or that he would have been disadvantaged by waiting. Zelnick's legal action on Jonathan's behalf was not a necessity to his "position and condition" at the time this service was rendered. The trial court thus did not err in so finding because its decision is supported by the record. We find sufficient support in the record for the trial court's judgment that Zelnick's legal services were not necessary for Jonathan's position and condition under all the circumstances. The trial court was thus correct in sustaining Jonathan's plea of infancy and denying any fee award to Zelnick. We will accordingly affirm the judgment of the trial court. Affirmed.Zelnick v. Adams 606 S.E.2d 843 (Va. 2005) The trust beneficiary filed a bill of complaint against his attorney for a declaration that the contract for legal services, entered into when beneficiary was a minor, was void. The Circuit Court, Prince William County, Thomas A. Fortkort, J., granted summary judgment voiding the contract, but the court awarded quantum meruit damages to the attorney. Both parties appealed. Agee, Justice "A contract with an infant is not void, only voidable by the infant upon attaining the age of majority." [Zelnick v. Adams, 263 Va. 601,] at 608, 561 S.E.2d [711,] at 715 [(2002)]. When a plea of infancy is timely raised, as in this case, the trial court makes a mixed inquiry of law and fact to ascertain whether the defense applies to the case at hand. As we described in Zelnick I, the initial inquiry of the trial court is a matter of law: "whether the 'things supplied' to the infant under a contract may fall within the general class of necessaries." Id. If this first query is answered in the affirmative, then the trial court proceeds to a second inquiry on a matter of fact: "whether there is sufficient evidence to allow the finder of fact to determine whether the things supplied were in fact necessary in the instant case." Id. Should this second inquiry also be answered in the affirmative, then the trial court must resolve a third query, also one of fact, which is "whether the 'things supplied' were actually necessary to the 'position and condition' of the infant"? Id. Should all three inquiries be answered in the affirmative, then the plea of infancy is defeated and the infant is bound "under an implied contract to pay what the goods or services furnished were reasonably worth." Id. In Zelnick I, the trial court erroneously answered the first inquiry in the negative because "a contract for legal services is within the 'general classes of necessaries' that may defeat a plea of infancy." Id. at 611, 561 S.E.2d at 717. Although our decision definitively answered the first inquiry as a matter of law, the prior record was without evidence upon which the trial court could answer the remaining questions of fact. See Id. at 612, 561 S.E.2d at 717-18. We, therefore, remanded the case for the taking of such evidence as necessary to answer those questions. Id., 561 S.E.2d at 718. Upon remand, Jonathan Ray Adams (Jonathan) contended the legal services provided for him by Robert J. Zelnick (Zelnick), under the contract executed for Jonathan by his mother, Mildred A. Adams (Adams) were not "in fact necessary." Alternatively, even if Zelnick's legal services were necessary, Jonathan argued they were not "actually necessary to the position and condition of the infant' " at the time rendered. Jonathan introduced evidence that he was living a comfortable lifestyle in a middle class home and was not "necessitous." He further argued that the suit filed by Zelnick was not necessary because his status as issue for purposes of distributions from the trusts of Jonathan's grandfather, Cecil D. Hylton, Sr. (Mr. Hylton) was settled by a Florida court's paternity order establishing Cecil D. Hylton, Jr. (Sonny) as his biological father. In addition, Jonathan contended no legal action was necessary during his minority because distributions under the trusts would not be made until 2014 and 2021, long after he was an adult. Accordingly, Jonathan averred no prejudice could have occurred to him had Zelnick waited until Jonathan was 18 and obtained his consent before proceeding with legal action against the trusts. Further, Jonathan testified the legal proceedings prosecuted by Zelnick had harmed Jonathan because it exacerbated tensions between Adams and Sonny thus adversely affecting him. In response, Zelnick contended the Florida court's paternity order was not determinative of Jonathan's status under the trusts. Moreover, Zelnick directed the trial court's attention to the fact that Mr. Hylton's will placed the decision as to Jonathan's