When Hurricane Katrina hit the Gulf Coast in 2005, Evangel Temple Assembly of God in Wichita Falls, Texas, contacted Wood Care Centers, Inc., about leasing a facility it owned to house evacuees from the hurricane. Evangel and Wood Care reached an agreement and signed a twenty-year lease at $10,997 per month. One clause said that Evangel could terminate the lease at any time by giving Wood Care notice and paying 10 percent of the balance remaining on the lease. Another clause stated that if the facility was not given a property tax exemption, Evangel had the option to terminate the lease. Nine months later, the last of the evacuees left the facility, and Evangel notified Wood Care that it would end the lease. Wood Care demanded the 10 percent payment. Evangel claimed that it did not need to make the payment because if the facility converted back to a “non-church” use, it would lose its tax-exempt status and Evangel could simply terminate the lease. Evangel’s pastor testified that the parties understood that this would be the scenario at the time the lease was signed. The trial court held that Evangel owed nothing. Wood Care appealed, contending that the trial court improperly allowed parol evidence to interpret the contract. Was the trial court’s acceptance of parol evidence correct? Why or why not? [Wood Care Centers, Inc. v. Evangel Temple Assembly of God of Wichita Falls, 307 S.W.3d 816303 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 2010)]