Section 7(a) (2) of the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA) is intended to protect species of animals against threats to their continuing existence caused by humans. The ESA instructs the Secretary of the Interior to promulgate a list of those endangered or threatened species and requires each federal agency, in consultation with the Secretary of the Interior, to ensure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered or threatened species.
In 1978, the Department of the Interior and the Department of Commerce promulgated a joint regulation stating that the obligations imposed by Section 7(a)(2) extended to actions taken in foreign nations. Thus, any actions taken by the United States would require consultation with the Department of the Interior. The Secretary of the Interior, however, reinterpreted the section to require consultation only for actions taken in the United States or on the high seas.
Almost immediately, organizations dedicated to wildlife conservation and other environmental causes sued Manuel Lujan, the Secretary of the Interior, and sought an injunction requiring the Secretary to promulgate a new regulation restoring the initial interpretation of the geographic scope. They claimed that U.S.-funded projects in Egypt and Sri Lanka would significantly reduce endangered and threatened species in the areas. Two members of Defenders of Wildlife, Joyce Kelly and Amy Skilbred, submitted affidavits indicating that they had traveled to foreign countries to observe endangered species (the Nile crocodile in Egypt, the Asian elephant and leopard in Sri Lanka) and that they planned to do so in the future. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that Kelly and Skilbred did not have standing to challenge the new interpretation.
In Bennett v. Spear, however, the Court held that ranchers in irrigation districts that would be directly affected economically by a Fish and Wildlife Service finding regarding two endangered species of fish had standing to challenge it. Why did they have standing when Kelly and Skilbred did not? [Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997).]