Social preferences and the prisoners’ dilemma Find the Nash equilibria in pure strategies in Table 11.2, when played by:

(a) Two egoists, for whom u(x, y)5 !x.

(b) Two utilitarians, for whom u(x, y)5 !x 1!y

.

(c) Two enviers, for whom u(x, y)5 !x2 !y.

(d) Two Rawlsians, for which u(x, y)5 min (!x

,

!y

).

Notice that this game (in dollar terms) has the payoff structure of the prison ers’ dilemma (Table 10.5 on page 225).

Table 11.2 Prisoners’ dilemma (in dollar terms)

C D

C $16,$16 $0,$25 D $25,$0 $9,$9