If you were asked to design a policy that would provide a solution to the agency problem in the company for which you work, where would you begin? According to many observers, there is a deep problem at the heart of modern capitalist economies. Modern economies rely on individuals, legally known as “agents,” who work for the best interests of others, the “principals.” For the system to work, agents must be loyal representatives of their principal’s interests, even in those situations when their own personal interest is at stake. For example, a member of a board of directors may act as an agent for the stockholders, executives act as agents for the boards, and attorneys and accountants act as agents for their clients. This agent–principal model assumes that individuals can put their own interests on hold and be sufficiently motivated to act on behalf of another. But this would seem to run counter to a view of human nature that is assumed by much of modern economic theory: Individuals are self-interested—thus, the “agency problem.” How can we trust self-interested individuals to act for the well-being of others in cases where to do so their own self-interest must be sacrificed?