1. What was the basis for Koontz arguing that there was a breach of the peace?

2. Did Chrysler have a right to repossess the car?

3. What determines the rights of the parties after default?

4. How did the court define a breach of the peace?

Koontz entered into an agreement with Chrysler to purchase a 1988 Sundance in exchange for 60 monthly payments of $185.92. When Koontz defaulted on the contract in early 1991, Chrysler notified him that it would repossess the vehicle if he did not make up the missed payments. Koontz notified Chrysler that he would make every effort to catch up on the payments, that he did not want the vehicle to be repossessed, and that Chrysler was not to enter his private property to repossess the car. Chrysler repossessed the car, however, according to the self-help repossession statute of the UCC.

When Koontz heard the repossession in progress, he rushed outside in his underwear and hollered, “Don’t take it,” to the repossessor. The repossessor did not respond and proceeded to take the vehicle. Chrysler sold the car and filed a complaint against Koontz seeking a deficiency judgment for the balance due on the loan. Koontz alleged that the repossession was a breach of the peace. From a judgment in favor of Chrysler, Koontz appealed.

JUDICIAL OPINION

KUEHN, J.… Koontz raises only a single issue on appeal. He contends that the trial court erred in finding that Chrysler’s repossession did not breach the peace because there was evidence that Koontz made an unequivocal oral protest to the repossession of his vehicle at the time of repossession. Koontz argues that when the vehicle was taken despite his protest, “Don’t take it,” a breach of the peace occurred, citing Dixon v. Ford Motor Credit Co. (1979) 72 Ill. App.3d 983, 391 N.E.2d 493. In Dixon, the court, relying upon White and Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 26-6, at 972, stated that “[w]hen a creditor repossesses in disregard of the debtor’s unequivocal oral protest, the repossession may be found to be in breach of the peace.”

Chrysler contends that Koontz’s oral protest did not breach the peace because “none of the elements of violence indicated in the decisions cited by the Defendant exists [sic] in this case.” Chrysler argues by implication that without an element of violence there can be no breach of the peace. Chrysler also argues that if we find that an oral protest without an element of violence constitutes a breach of the peace, then we would be narrowing the self-help repossession statute to the point that it would be useless to a secured creditor.

We recognize that the self-help repossession statute extends a conditional self-help privilege to secured parties; however, we must apply the statute in a way that reduces the risk to the public associated with extrajudicial conflict resolution. It is apparent that the self-help remedy is efficient for secured creditors and results in reduced costs for both creditors and debtors. Efficiency and reduced litigation costs are desirable. Still, a debtor’s private property interests and society’s interest in tranquility must also be protected. Because self-help repossession is statutory, we look to the language of § 9-503 to establish the parameters of the remedy that the statute offers to secured parties who seek to repossess collateral without judicial process. The statute provides in pertinent part: “Unless otherwise agreed a secured ……….