On March 13, 1963, Ernesto Miranda was arrested for kidnapping and rape and taken to a Phoenix police station. After being identified by the complaining witness, he was questioned by two police officers, who emerged from the interrogation room two hours later with a written and signed confession. At the top of the statement was a typed paragraph stating the confession was made voluntarily, without threats or promises of immunity, and “with full knowledge of my legal rights, understanding any statement I make may be used against me.”
At trial, the officers admitted Miranda had not been advised he had a right to have an attorney present, and the written confession was admitted into evidence over the objection of defense counsel. The officers testified to a prior oral confession made by Miranda during the interrogation. Miranda was found guilty and sentenced to 20 to 30 years’ imprisonment. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arizona held that Miranda’s constitutional rights were not violated and affirmed the conviction. Miranda appealed to the Supreme Court, which joined his case with the cases of three other defendants making similar constitutional arguments regarding a violation of rights.
JUSTICE WARREN The cases before us raise questions which go to the roots of our concepts of American criminal jurisprudence: the restraints society must observe consistent with the Federal Constitution in prosecuting individuals for crime. More specifically, we deal with the admissibility of statements obtained from an individual who is subjected to custodial police interrogation and the necessity for procedures which assure that the individual is accorded his privilege under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution not to be compelled to incriminate himself.
This case is but an explication of basic rights enshrined in our Constitution—that “No person … shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,” and that “the accused shall … have the Assistance of Counsel”—rights which were put in jeopardy in this case through official overbearing. These precious rights were fixed in our Constitution only after centuries of persecution and struggle. And in the words of Chief Justice Marshall, they were secured “for ages to come, and … designed to approach immortality as nearly as human institutions can approach it.”
Our holding … briefly stated is this: the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.
As for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following measures are required.
Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him. The mere fact that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned.
From the testimony of the officers and by the admission of respondent, it is clear that Miranda was not in any way apprised of his right to consult with an attorney and to have one present during the interrogation, nor was his right not to be compelled to incriminate himself effectively protected in any other manner.
Without these warnings the statements were inadmissible. The mere fact that he signed a statement which contained a typed-in clause stating that he had “full knowledge” of his “legal rights” does not approach the knowing and intelligent waiver required to relinquish constitutional rights.
Therefore, in accordance with the foregoing, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Arizona is reversed.
REVERSED.

CRITICAL THINKING
What is the reasoning structure in the Miranda case?
Does Justice Warren offer a logically powerful argument for giving defendants’ rights greater protection than was customary at the time?

ETHICAL DECISION MAKING:
In arguing for greater protection of the rights of the accused, what values is Justice Warren upholding?
With what values might Justice Warren’s values be in contention?