What is meant by “piercing the corporate veil?” On what basis did the majority decide that the corporate veil need not be pierced in this case? How does the dissent respond?

On October 27, 1997, Ho individually purchased a defunct hospital and medical office building in Houston to develop the property as residential housing. Ho knew there was asbestos onsite. He was also aware that any alteration to asbestos–containing materials was to be handled by personnel licensed and registered with the Texas Department of Health (“TDH”). Ho instead hired Manuel Escobedo and Corston Tate, whose work he had previously used, to do the renovations. Escobedo hired 11 Mexican nationals, who were illegal immigrants, to assist. Renovations, including the removal of asbestos, started in January 1998.
At most, the workers were occasionally given dust masks not suitable for protection against asbestos. They were not issued protective clothing. Ho also did not provide a respiratory protection program, conduct medical surveillance, conduct asbestos monitoring, implement adequate ventilation or debris removal, inform the workers of the presence and hazards of asbestos, or provide any training whatsoever. There is no dispute that Ho was aware of the worksite conditions; he visited almost every day.
On February 2, 1998, a city inspector visited the worksite. After observing the conditions, he issued a stop–work order citing the possibility of exposure to asbestos, requiring that city approval be given before work could resume. Ho then began negotiating with a licensed contractor, Alamo Environmental, to remove the asbestos.…
However, during this period of negotiation, Ho had resumed work at the site under the same conditions, except that he directed all work be performed at night. The workers ate, and some lived, at the site. The workers had no potable water and only one portable toilet.… Ho continued to visit the worksite and was aware of these conditions.
Asbestos removal continued in this fashion until March 10, 1998. On March 11, 1998, as Ho had directed, daytime work resumed at the site. Ho had been informed that either the sprinkler system or fire hydrant valves had not been turned off and thus remained available for use. To wash out the building, Ho directed Tate to tap into an unmarked valve believed to be a water line. It turned out to be a gas line. An explosion later occurred when Tate started his truck; it injured Tate and two workers. On March 12, 1998, workers were summoned to Ho‘s office where they were given releases to sign, acknowledging receipt of $1000 as full payment for their work, and acknowledging receipt of $100 to release Ho from any claims that might arise from the explosion and fire.
The releases were written in English, but an interpreter translated them for the workers.
After the explosion, TDH conducted an investigation. Samples of debris and the ambient air at the worksite showed levels of asbestos in excess of federal and state standards.
The state notified Ho that the site remained unsafe and needed to be sealed by qualified personnel. Again, Ho used the same workers to install plywood over the windows and did not give them any protective equipment.…2. What is required for a “willful” violation of the OSH Act’s general duty clause? For a “serious”
violation? Why does the majority uphold the Commission’s rule that the violation in this case was not willful? On what basis would the dissent have reversed the Commission’s holding?

On October 27, 1997, Ho individually purchased a defunct hospital and medical office building in Houston to develop the property as residential housing. Ho knew there was asbestos onsite. He was also aware that any alteration to asbestos–containing materials was to be handled by personnel licensed and registered with the Texas Department of Health (“TDH”). Ho instead hired Manuel Escobedo and Corston Tate, whose work he had previously used, to do the renovations. Escobedo hired 11 Mexican nationals, who were illegal immigrants, to assist. Renovations, including the removal of asbestos, started in January 1998.
At most, the workers were occasionally given dust masks not suitable for protection against asbestos. They were not issued protective clothing. Ho also did not provide a respiratory protection program, conduct medical surveillance, conduct asbestos monitoring, implement adequate ventilation or debris removal, inform the workers of the presence and hazards of asbestos, or provide any training whatsoever. There is no dispute that Ho was aware of the worksite conditions; he visited almost every day.
On February 2, 1998, a city inspector visited the worksite. After observing the conditions, he issued a stop–work order citing the possibility of exposure to asbestos, requiring that city approval be given before work could resume. Ho then began negotiating with a licensed contractor, Alamo Environmental, to remove the asbestos.…
However, during this period of negotiation, Ho had resumed work at the site under the same conditions, except that he directed all work be performed at night. The workers ate, and some lived, at the site. The workers had no potable water and only one portable toilet.… Ho continued to visit the worksite and was aware of these conditions.
Asbestos removal continued in this fashion until March 10, 1998. On March 11, 1998, as Ho had directed, daytime work resumed at the site. Ho had been informed that either the sprinkler system or fire hydrant valves had not been turned off and thus remained available for use. To wash out the building, Ho directed Tate to tap into an unmarked valve believed to be a water line. It turned out to be a gas line. An explosion later occurred when Tate started his truck; it injured Tate and two workers. On March 12, 1998, workers were summoned to Ho‘s office where they were given releases to sign, acknowledging receipt of $1000 as full payment for their work, and acknowledging receipt of $100 to release Ho from any claims that might arise from the explosion and fire.
The releases were written in English, but an interpreter translated them for the workers.
After the explosion, TDH conducted an investigation. Samples of debris and the ambient air at the worksite showed levels of asbestos in excess of federal and state standards.
The state notified Ho that the site remained unsafe and needed to be sealed by qualified personnel. Again, Ho used the same workers to install plywood over the windows and did not give them any protective equipment.…3. What difference does it make to the story of this case that the workers involved were illegal immigrants? Does it make any difference to the legal analysis? Do you think it should?

On October 27, 1997, Ho individually purchased a defunct hospital and medical office building in Houston to develop the property as residential housing. Ho knew there was asbestos onsite. He was also aware that any alteration to asbestos–containing materials was to be handled by personnel licensed and registered with the Texas Department of Health (“TDH”). Ho instead hired Manuel Escobedo and Corston Tate, whose work he had previously used, to do the renovations. Escobedo hired 11 Mexican nationals, who were illegal immigrants, to assist. Renovations, including the removal of asbestos, started in January 1998.
At most, the workers were occasionally given dust masks not suitable for protection against asbestos. They were not issued protective clothing. Ho also did not provide a respiratory protection program, conduct medical surveillance, conduct asbestos monitoring, implement adequate ventilation or debris removal, inform the workers of the presence and hazards of asbestos, or provide any training whatsoever. There is no dispute that Ho was aware of the worksite conditions; he visited almost every day.
On February 2, 1998, a city inspector visited the worksite. After observing the conditions, he issued a stop–work order citing the possibility of exposure to asbestos, requiring that city approval be given before work could resume. Ho then began negotiating with a licensed contractor, Alamo Environmental, to remove the asbestos.…
However, during this period of negotiation, Ho had resumed work at the site under the same conditions, except that he directed all work be performed at night. The workers ate, and some lived, at the site. The workers had no potable water and only one portable toilet.… Ho continued to visit the worksite and was aware of these conditions.
Asbestos removal continued in this fashion until March 10, 1998. On March 11, 1998, as Ho had directed, daytime work resumed at the site. Ho had been informed that either the sprinkler system or fire hydrant valves had not been turned off and thus remained available for use. To wash out the building, Ho directed Tate to tap into an unmarked valve believed to be a water line. It turned out to be a gas line. An explosion later occurred when Tate started his truck; it injured Tate and two workers. On March 12, 1998, workers were summoned to Ho‘s office where they were given releases to sign, acknowledging receipt of $1000 as full payment for their work, and acknowledging receipt of $100 to release Ho from any claims that might arise from the explosion and fire.
The releases were written in English, but an interpreter translated them for the workers.
After the explosion, TDH conducted an investigation. Samples of debris and the ambient air at the worksite showed levels of asbestos in excess of federal and state standards.
The state notified Ho that the site remained unsafe and needed to be sealed by qualified personnel. Again, Ho used the same workers to install plywood over the windows and did not give them any protective equipment.…