13. The circuits are divided on whether the law of the transferor court under 28 U.S.C. §

1407 ought to apply to a federal claim. In IN RE KOREAN AIR LINES DISASTER OF SEPT.

1, 1983, 829 F.2d 1171, 1174–76(D.C.Cir.1987), affirmed on other grounds sub nom. Chan v.

Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122, 109 S.Ct. 1676, 104 L.Ed.2d 113 (1989), authored by then-Judge Ginsburg, the appeals court held that the law of the transferee court deserved attention, but did not warrant stare decisis effect in this context. The court explained:

Application of Van Dusen in the matter before us * * * would not produce uniformity. * *

* Applying divergent interpretations of the governing federal law to plaintiffs, depending solely upon where they initially filed suit, would surely reduce the efficiencies achievable through consolidated preparatory proceedings. Indeed, because there is ultimately a single proper interpretation of federal law, the attempt to ascertain and apply diverse circuit interpretations simultaneously is inherently self-contradictory. Our system contemplates differences between different states’ laws; thus a multidistrict judge asked to apply divergent state positions on a point of law would face a coherent, if sometimes difficult, task. But it is logically inconsistent to require one judge to apply simultaneously different and conflicting interpretations of what is supposed to be a unitary federal law.

* * *

* * * The federal courts spread across the country owe respect to each other’s efforts and should strive to avoid conflicts, but each has an obligation to engage independently in reasoned analysis. Binding precedent for all is set only by the Supreme Court, and for the district courts within a circuit, only by the court of appeals for that circuit.