7. In MIMS v. ARROW FINANCIAL SERVICES, LLC., 565 U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 740, 181 L.Ed.2d 881 (2012), the Supreme Court resolved that Congress’s grant of jurisdiction to state courts to hear disputes arising under the federal Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, regulating telemarketing, did not oust federal courts of jurisdiction to hear claims under the act. Rather, the state and federal courts had concurrent jurisdiction. The relevant statutory language provided that a person “may, if otherwise permitted by318the laws or rules of [a]

court of a State, bring in an appropriate court of that State” an action to redress a violation of rights. 47 U.S.C. §§ 227(b)(3), (c)(5). Justice Ginsburg, writing for a unanimous Court, held that federal jurisdiction was “not swept away” by the statute: “[W]hen federal law creates a private right of action and furnishes the substantive rules of decision, the claim arises under federal law, and district courts possess federal-question jurisdiction under § 1331.” Id. at ___, 132 S.Ct. at 748 49, 181 L.Ed.2d at 894. She added, “Even when a right of action is created by state law, if the claim requires resolution of significant issues of federal law, the case may arise under federal law for 28 U.S.C. § 1331 purposes.” Id. at ___ n. 9, 132 S.Ct. at 749 n. 9, 181 L.Ed.2d at 894 n. 9. Does Mims clarify or change the test for determining whether federal question jurisdiction is present? See Mulligan, YouCan’t Go Holmes Again, 107 Nw. U.L.

Rev. 237 (2012).