2. (8 points total) Consider the following game: H 2-2 T O -2,2 0,1 -2:2 2-2 0,1 1,0 1:0 H T O (a) (3 points) Find the pure strategy best responses, you may either write them out or mark them on the table but if you mark them on the table explain your notation. -2;-2 (b) (2 points) The strategy O is not a pure strategy best response, is it a best response to any mixed strategies? Explain why not or give an example. Use this to explain why we can not eliminate strategies that are never a best response when finding dominated strategies: (c) (3 points) Find the unique Nash equilbrium of this game. 3. (10 points total) Consider the following normal form game: a 3 3:4 6:4 2:0 0:6 7.7 3:7 C4,2 7,3 3,3 A (a) (3 points) Find the pure strategy best responses, you may either write them out or mark them on the table but if you mark them on the table explain your notation. (b) (1 point) Find all the pure strategy Nash equilibria 1 (c) (2 points) Find one action that is dominated in this game, and care- fully explain why it is dominated. (d) (2 points) Find the set of strategies that surives iterated removal of dominated strategies. (e) (1 point) Define a weakly dominated strategy. My (f) (1 point) In this game explain why iterated removal of weakly dom- inated strategies is not an implication of rationality.