1. Though the court was quite clear that simply identifying workers as volunteers is insufficient to prevent Title VII application, does the name by which an employer calls its workers matter at all? In other words, does it matter at all whether the employer calls its workers volunteers or employees, or is it completely irrelevant?

2. Of the factors considered critical by the court in reaching its conclusion, which seem more critical to a determination of employment status? Do you agree with the court in its choice to apply the threshold-remuneration test, rather than to treat remuneration as only one factor in assessing whether a worker is an employee?

3. Can you think of public policy reasons why Title VII should be interpreted or amended to require employers to consider some or all volunteer workers as employees?

Issue: Whether a volunteer can be considered to be an employee within Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Facts: Rachel Juino was a volunteer firefighter with the Livingston Parish Fire District No. 5 from November 2009 to April 2010. As she was a volunteer she did not receive a salary but received many benefits. Juino claims that during her tenure, fellow firefighter John Sullivan subjected her to sexual harassment on several occasions. She terminated her services with District 5 on April 2, 2010. After not receiving a right-to-sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) within six months of filing her claim, Juino filed suit in the district court, alleging sexual harassment and retaliation under Title VII. District 5 moved for partial summary judgment, claiming that it was not an “employer” for purposes of Title VII. Juino opposed the motion, contending that District 5 was an “employer.” Juino appealed to the Fifth circuit.

Decision: The district court treated District 5’s motion for partial summary judgment as a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b) (1) by concluding that the minimum “employee” requirement was a jurisdictional issue and dismissing the case on this basis. It is undisputed that Juino did not receive a salary and that she responded to 39 calls, which resulted in compensation of $78.00. She also received a life insurance policy, a uniform and badge, and emergency/first responders’ training. Thus, it was concluded that as a matter of law that Juino was not an “employee” for purposes of Title VII because she failed to make a threshold showing of remuneration. Juino’s benefits were held to be purely incidental to her volunteer service with District 5. Therefore, in an issue of first impression by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the court held that Juino was not an “employee” within the meaning of Title VII