Margaret Wright retired from her position as a caseworker at the Peoria Field Office of the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (“The Department”) after the Department ordered her to undergo a fitness-for-duty evaluation. Ms. Wright then filed this action alleging … that the Department had violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) by ordering her to undergo the evaluation and by causing her subsequent constructive discharge. The case was tried before a jury (“Wright I”) which found in favor of Ms. Wright on the ADA claim but awarded no compensatory damages. The Department filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law or, alternatively, for a new trial, contending that Ms. Wright had failed to establish an ADA violation and that the jury had been instructed improperly. The district court granted the Department’s motion for a new trial. During the second trial (“Wright II”) … the Department moved for judgment as a matter of law on the ground that Ms. Wright had failed to establish that she had been constructively discharged. The court granted the motion and entered judgment for the Department. Ms. Wright appealed. The appeals court held that in Wright I, that the district court did not err in denying the Department’s motion for judgment as a matter of law. On that record, there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Department’s fitness-for-duty evaluation order was consistent with business necessity. In Wright II, the district court did not err in granting the Department’s motion for judgment as a matter of law. Ms. Wright did not establish that the Department’s conduct communicated that her termination was imminent. 

1. What were the legal issues in this case? What did the appeals court decide?

2. Why did ordering the fitness-for-duty evaluation (FFDE) violate the ADA?  

3. Why does the court reject the plaintiff’s argument that she was forced to quit (“constructively discharged”) because of her unwillingness to submit to the FFDE? If the agency had actually terminated her for her refusal, would that change anything? Why or why not? 

4. What are some practical implications of this decision for employers dealing with “problem” employees?