Tom worked for a messenger service owned by Dalton. While Tom was driving a Dalton-owned vehicle on busi- ness in Miami, he hit and injured Pedro, a pedestrian who resides in Alabama. Pedro brought a diversity action against Dalton in federal court in Florida on a theory of respondent superior (principal-agent). Personal service was properly made, pursuant to FRCP 4(e)(2), on Dalton, a Florida resident. Dalton now wishes to implead Tom as a third-party defendant (if Dalton is held liable to Pedro, Dalton will be entitled to indemnity from Tom). Tom is a resident of Puerto Rico and lives in San Juan, a two-hour flight from Miami. Dalton caused a licensed process server to serve Tom personally at Tom's home in San Juan. Assume that Florida has no long-arm statute allowing state-court jurisdiction over any defendant who cannot be physically found in Florida. Does the Florida federal court have personal jurisdiction over Dalton's third-party claim against Tom?

a. Yes, because Tom was a third-party defendant who was served within 100 miles of the federal courthouse.

b. No, because there is no Florida long-arm statute that would authorize state-court jurisdiction over Tom.

c. Yes, because service was properly made on Dalton within Florida, the state or district where the federal suit is pending.

d. Yes, because Pedro, Dalton, and Tom are all citizens of different states or districts.

e. None of the above.