Pcorians are eating more Chplandian chocolate than ever, and politicians in the Pcorian parliament are starting to propose interventions to reduce chocolate consumption. Assume again that Pcorian citizens are beta-delta discounters with β = 0.5 and δ = 2/3. 

a. First take the approach of the dictatorship of the present, and assume that Pcorians are sophisticated hyperbolic discounters. How many bars of chocolate “should” each Pcorian citizen eat today, and how many bars of chocolate “should” each Pcorian citizen eat tomorrow?

b. According to this view, what is the optimal tariff to place on Chplandian chocolate bars starting tomorrow so that citizens will eat the right amount?

c. The Pcorian parliament passes your suggested optimal tariff for a trial period of one day. How much will tomorrow’s Pcorians be harmed by this one-day tariff? Compare costs and benefits from the perspective of tomorrow’s consumer with the tax to the costs and benefits without the tax.

d. According to the revealed-preference school of thought, what is wrong with this tariff strategy?

e. Is the tariff a Pareto self-improving intervention? Explain why or why not.

f. Suppose the tariff were not a one-day trial, but instead were permanent. Without doing any explicit calculations, explain briefly how that would change your answer to Exercise 11(c).