The beginning of post-dictatorial periods in Latin American countries was characterised by the creation of a nel democratic era. In the case of Brazil, it meant the creation of a whole new legal system under the 1988 Constitl tion. The country re-embraced democracy and started a new era of social and economic development. Anothel aspect of the 1988 Constitution, however, had a tremendous importance for the country: it shaped the Brazilian merit-based bureaucratic public sector system in an effort to overcome clientelism.

Clientelism is the exchange of goods and services for political support, often involving explicit or implicit quid pro quo. Clientelism is the reverse version of a merit-based system. It has been one of the biggest obstacles to economic growth and public sector efficiency in Latin America. Under the regime of a clientelist state, government bureaucrats are not hired based on knowledge, personal qualifications, or organisational skills, but merely on network and political connections. Architects of the 1988 Constitution chose to address the problem of clier telism by implementing a regime where the majority of government jobs would be filled based on a competitive entry examination called the concurso. Under this regime, only the top qualifiers of government exams, i.e. the ones with highest scores, would be hired (the rule applies to all three government branches). This constitutional requirement intended to avoid clientelism and nepotism (hiring based on kinship) in government.

There is, however, an inherent collateral effect to the merit-based bureaucratic public sector system. Tenured public employees have very little chance of being dismissed by public organisations in which they work. Most future bureaucrats face an average directed study period of two to six years before passing the entry-level examination for a public sector life-time position. They dedicate time and money into an effort that will eventually secure a job for the rest of their lives. As mentioned above, the overwhelming majority of positions require this examination - including paid internships. After passing the exam, a three-year period will give them tenure. Because of such privilege, public employees get easily accommodated over time and tend to perform below expectations.

As a consequence, the implementation of performance management in Brazil could face several challenges. Brazilian bureaucracy is yet far from the requirements advocated by the performance management doctrine, which calls for more focus on results and increased managerial authority, as previously implemented in countrie such as Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. The current system has a low focus on results and lo managerial authority as a result of administrative restrictions over human resources. Recently, initiatives at the state and local levels have attempted to address this issue.

Questions

1 'Given the facts and challenges outlined above, it is futile for the Brazilians to attempt to introduce performance measurement in their public sector system.' How would you argue against this assertion?

2 What do you foresee as the key difficulties in implementing a performance management system and how would you set about reducing them?