1. Assess the fairness of the following statement in light of the Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines precedent case: “An employer-dominated organization robs employees of the freedom to choose their own representative.”
2. Read Section 8(a)(2) of the Act and identify the three forms of employer conduct prohibited by this section of the Act.
3. Did the employer’s conduct in this case constitute “domination” in the foundation and administration of the Action Committees?

[The respondent, Electromation, manufactures electrical components and employs some 200 employees. These employees were not represented by a labor organization during the relevant time period involved in this case. In late 1988, the company cut expenses by altering the existing employee attendance bonus policy and, in lieu of a wage increase for 1989, it distributed year-end lump-sum payments based on length of service. Shortly after these changes, the company received a petition signed by 68 employees expressing displeasure with the new attendance policy. Thereafter, on January 11, company president John Howard met with a selected group of eight employees and discussed with them a number of issues, including wages, bonuses, incentive pay, attendance programs, and leave policy. Howard testified that it was decided after the January 11 meeting that "it was very unlikely that further unilateral management action to resolve these problems was going to come anywhere near making everybody happy …
and we thought that the best course of action would be to involve the employees in coming up with solutions to these issues." Howard testified further that management came up with the idea of "action committees" as a method to involve employees.
On January 19, the company posted a memorandum to all employees announcing the formation of five action committees and posted sign-up sheets for each action committee. The memorandum explained that each action committee would consist of six employees and one or two members of management as well as the employee benefits manager, Loretta Dickey, who would coordinate all the action committees. The sign-up sheets explained the responsibilities and goals of each committee. No employees were involved in the drafting of the policy goals expressed in the sign-up sheets. The company determined the number of employees permitted to sign up for the action committees, and it informed two employees who had signed up for more than one committee that each would be limited to participation on one committee. After the action committees were organized, the Company posted a notice to all employees announcing the members of each committee and the dates of the initial committee meetings. The action committees were designated as (1) Absenteeism Infractions, (2) No Smoking Policy, (3) Communication Network, (4) Pay Progression for Premium Positions, and (5) Attendance Bonus Program.
Dickey testified that management expected that employee members on the committees would "kind of talk back and forth" with the other employees in the plant and get their ideas, and that, indeed, the purpose of the postings was to ensure that "anyone [who] wanted to know what was going on, they could go to these people" on the action committees. The company paid employees for time spent on committee work and supplied necessary materials. The Teamsters Union made a demand for recognition on February 13. On March 15, Howard informed employees that "due to the Union's campaign, the Company would be unable to participate in the committee meetings and could not continue to work with the committees until after the election," which was to be held on March 31.]

From the Opinion of the Board
… This case presents the issue of whether "Action Committees" composed, in part, of the Respondent's employees constitute a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act and whether the Respondent's conduct vis-à-vis the "Action Committees"
violated Section 8(a)(2) and (1) of the Act. In the notice of hearing of May 14, 1991, the Board framed the pertinent issues as follows:
1. At what point does an employee committee lose its protection as a communication device and become a labor organization?
2. What conduct of an employer constitutes domination or interference with the employee committee?….
… Congress viewed the abolition of employerdominated organizations as essential to the Act's purpose. After Congress passed the Act in 1935, a first order of business for the Board, backed by the Supreme Court, was to weed out employerdominated organizations. Indeed, the very first unfair labor practice case decided by the Board raised the issues of whether an organization was a labor organization under Section 2(5) and whether the employer had dominated that organization in violation of Section 8(a)(2) and (1). Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines,
1 NLRB 1 (1935), enfd. denied in part 91 F.2d 178 (3d Cir. 1937), revd. 303 U.S. 261 (1938). In that case, the Board, as affirmed by the Supreme Court, found that the organization at issue was an employee representation plan under Section 2(5), that the organization was entirely the creation of management, which planned it, sponsored it, and foisted it on employees who had never requested it, and that the organization's functions were described and given to it by management. 1 NLRB at 13-14.
The Greyhound plan was entirely typical of the "employee representation plans or committees" perceived as so pernicious by Senator Wagner and ultimately by Congress. Greyhound management founded the association in 1933. The manager charged with establishing the association wrote that it is to our interest to pick out employees to serve on the committee who will work for the interest of the company and will not be radical. This plan of representation should work out very well providing the proper men are selected, and considerable thought should be given to the men placed on this responsible Committee.